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SELF-PATERNALISM IN THE MARKETPLACE
Bailey Kuklin*
The invisible hand theory of the market assumes that persons are
fully informed, rational actors.' Rationality is central also to the
law. The law ascribes responsibility only when acts or actors meet
certain minimum conditions of rationality. Just as market theory
normally assumes the rational ecomomic-person, the law normally
assumes the rational legal-person. Each conceptual person is insuf-
ficient to base a realistic economic or legal theory upon, and each
contains conundrums. One of the conundrums arises from the
asymmetries among the different actors in the marketplace, and it is
the consequence of these asymmetries which are the topic of this
paper.
In another paper, I analyze the conditions of legal responsibility
as exemplified by the different actors in the marketplace involved in
a hypothetical, occasional purchase of a home appliance. 2 While I
conclude that neither the consumer nor the merchant satisfy strong
conditions of legal responsibility, the merchant usually comes sub-
stantially closer than the consumer.3 There is, in short, asymmetri-
cal rationality in the overlapping arenas of legal and economic
interactions. This asymmetry is inherent to the typical circum-
stances of the marketplace.
One may question whether the merchant has a proper moral
claim to the advantage of the inherent asymmetry. Often the
merchant, driven by economic incentives, intentionally exacerbates
existing sources of consumer irrationalities, or creates new ones, as
by means of advertisements, devoid of relevant information, which
hinge upon the fame or sexual appeal of the spokesperson. The
merchant's moral claim to the advantage of this asymmetry is even
more problematic when it is actually imposed on the consuming
public. Upon close inspection the invisible hand operates neither
fairly nor, it seems, efficiently. Insofar as this is the case, the con-
* I thank John Cirace for valuable comments on a prior draft. The Brooklyn Law
School generously supported this project with a Summer research stipend.
1. See, e.g., ALLEN E. BUCHANAN, ETHICS, EFFICIENCY, AND THE MARKET 14 (1985).
For an argument that the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith's vision is not as invisible as is
usually assumed today, see Brian P. Malloy, Invisible Hand or Sleight of Hand? Adam Smith,
Richard Posner and the Philosophy of Law and Economics, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 209 (1988).
2. See Bailey Kuklin, The Asymmetrical Conditions of Legal Responsibility in the Marketplace,
44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893 (1990).
3. The term "merchant" is often used in this article as shorthand for merchant,
producer, manufacturer, service provider, etc.
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sumer may be justified in countering her disadvantage through pri-
vate action or the invocation of government action. The aim of this
article is to give voice to the moral claims of the consumer,
merchant, and other interested parties in light of promising coun-
termeasures by the consumer designed to offset the apparent ineffi-
ciency and the asymmetrical conditions of legal responsibility in the
marketplace.
Before proceeding to the main task, I shall summarize my prior
analysis of the conditions of legal responsibility and the conclusions
drawn from applying it to the marketplace. This article picks up at
the point where the consumer contemplates responses to the asym-
metry. The rational consumer, realizing she is unavoidably disad-
vantaged once she enters the current marketplace, would consider
means to prevent this prior to entering. Her motivation is to pro-
tect herself, not to protect others - self-paternalism, not paternal-
ism. This response by the consumer is a major focus of this article.
The consumer will ponder private self-paternalistic solutions, such
as individual tactics or privately administered, concerted action.
Unfortunately, these tactics are insufficient to the task of readjusting
one's relative power in the marketplace.
As a response to this imbalance in power, the consumer must con-
sider government intervention by regulation. Useful self-paternalis-
tic regulations, however, have economic and moral spillover effects,
most obviously on the merchant, but on others as well. These spil-
lovers are addressed in a "neutral dialogue" as espoused by Bruce
Ackerman. Hypothetical interested parties express their views in a
regulated moral conversation. While the dialogue may silence the
self-regarding objections of the merchant, the claims of the other
parties are more insistent. In the end, these claims cannot be si-
lenced entirely, especially when the problems of government inter-
vention are judged by the same criteria of rationality on which the
consumer's original justification for intervention is based. Conse-
quently, especially in light of the interests of third parties, society
must proceed cautiously in readjusting the asymmetries between the
consumer and the merchant.
- I. RESPONSIBILITY
The question of whether to hold an actor legally or morally re-
sponsible directs attention to both the antecedent choice and the
consequent act. First, though various labels are used for this and
the other notions discussed, the standard for the choice may be
characterized in terms of autonomy. A responsible choice turns on
the actor's autonomous decisionmaking. For example, decisions
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made in total ignorance or under undue influence fail this test.
They do not reflect the actor's independent will. Second, the act
ensuing from the choice must be a product of the actor's willpower.
An irresistible impulse, for example, is not an act in an appropriate
sense. Only an autonomous decision linked to a willful act is volun-
tary, thus giving rise to responsibility.
For a choice to be autonomous, it must satisfy two categories of
conditions: knowledge and capability. These two categories are fur-
ther subdivided. First, knowledge consists of information and fore-
seeability, that is: (i) data regarding the state of affairs and, (ii)
suitable predictability of the consequences of contemplated acts. If
one must shoot in the dark, ignorant of either the factual circum-
stances or the possible results, the act is not reflective of the person,
and, therefore, one does not deserve the benefit or burden of the
outcome. Second, capability consists of reason and sense, that is: (i)
the ability to utilize data to draw sound factual and probabilistic
conclusions, and (ii) normative judgment or values that are mini-
mally acceptable. Upon becoming fairly informed of the present
and the potential future, one must be capable of using the knowl-
edge adequately to strive in an allowable manner for socially per-
missible purposes. In sum, autonomy requires both knowledge and
capability.
In the marketplace, both the merchant and the consumer fall
short of the ideals of the invisible hand and full responsibility.
There are various ways to analyze these imperfections. In discuss-
ing them in my prior paper, I advanced the polar perspectives of
whether the distortions are inherent or imposed, or internal or ex-
ternal. I offered also a typology of distortions, extensively docu-
mented by the social sciences, which uses the labels framing,
heuristic, environmental, and semantic. Although these eight terms
do not have self-evident meanings, they need not be detailed here.
What is important is the fact that the imperfections in the market-
place are substantial and imply inefficiency because persons are un-
likely to move resources to higher states of utility insofar as their
acts are not fully rational. Though neither the merchant nor the
consumer is in a position to be completely rational in a strong sense,
the usual situation gives the merchant an inherent advantage (e.g.,
the economies of scale) which it may intentionally enlarge (i.e., by
imposing distortions on the consumer's decisionmaking as by adver-
tising ploys). This suggests that unfairness may go along with the
inefficiency.
Given this state of affairs, the consumer must face the conclusion
that, once she is in the marketplace, she is relegated to bargaining
1992]
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under circumstances of inherent and imposed disadvantage. This
disadvantage stems from an asymmetrical rationality or disparity in
the satisfaction of the conditions of responsibility between her and
the merchant. The consumer's resistance to the disadvantage is not
unfair because there is no prima facie right of the merchant to reap
its advantage. The rational consumer will ponder methods to rectify
this. The rectification, of course, must itself be reasonable and sen-
sible. The solution must avoid primary and secondary effects that
exacerbate the irrationalities, perhaps causing greater inefficiency.
Furthermore, it must be fair. Fairness must be emphasized, be-
cause, otherwise, the consumer's position merely boils down to the
point that it is rational for one to maximize one's utility. This is
rejected out of hand as an inadequate moral grounding which ig-
nores claims of right.
The consumer who intends to surmount the differential rational-
ity must clear substantial hurdles. Though she enters the market-
place armed with a general awareness of her disadvantages and a
strengthened resolve to overcome them, many of them will inevita-
bly persist. Their very nature prevents complete mastering even by
the most single-minded, rational consumer. Some elements of the
differential, such as access to information, are not simply matters of
resolve and clear thinking which can be coped with once one is in
the marketplace. For example, the cost of obtaining equal informa-
tion may be too great to rationally incur in light of the value of the
goods in question. Because of these costs, it may be better for the
consumer to protect herself through restructuring the rules of the
game. This revision may involve the imposition of rules that protect
the consumer by restructuring her freedom to act - the restrictions
would be self-paternalistic.
II. THE NATURE OF SELF-PATERNALISM
The rational consumer, realizing that once she enters the market-
place she will be unavoidably and unfairly disadvantaged, would
consider restructuring the marketplace ex ante to level the playing
field. She may trade off beforehand part of her claim to freely bar-
gain, as by mandating certain contract term offerings, thereby limit-
ing her own subsequent choices or formal freedom in order to
652 [Vol. 60
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increase her material freedom. 4 This is not a paternalistic ploy on
her part, rather it is self-paternalistic. 5
4. The conceptual distinction between material freedom (freedom in fact) and
formal freedom (freedom in principle), under various labels, is not new. Weber noticed
it. See MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 188-91 (Max Rheinstein ed.,
1954); MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 184-86
(Talcott Parsons ed., 1947). Dewey wrote in terms of "real" and "formal" freedom. See
MORTON G. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA 101-02 (1949). Rawls and Hart
similarly distinguished between the existence of liberty and the worth or value of it. See
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 204-05 (1971); H.L.A. HART, Are There Any Natural
Rights?, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 53, 53 n.2 (Anthony Quinton ed., 1967). Feinberg
discussed the distinction between dejure and defacto autonomy, sovereignty, liberty, and
freedom. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 31-44, 62-66 (1986) [hereinafter FEINBERG,
HARM TO SELF]; Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Privacy: Moral Ideas in the
Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 461-64 (1983) [hereinafter Feinberg,
Autonomy]. For example, de facto autonomy is "[tihe actual condition of self-
government", while de jure autonomy is "[tihe sovereign right of self-government."
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra, at 65 (Diagram 19-1).
The political right has disputed the distinction in order to counter arguments related
to mine. See, e.g.,John Gray, Hayek on Liberty, Rights, and Justice, 92 ETHICS 73, 75 (1981).
For an argument that the distinction may be a confusion between "liberty" and
"power," "ability" or "option," in other words, between negative and positive liberty,
see James M. Buchanan & Loren E. Lomasky, The Matrix of ContractarianJustice, Soc. PHIL.
& POL'Y, Autumn 1984, at 12, 17; Michael E. Levin, Negative Liberty, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y,
Autumn 1984, at 84, 84-88; Jan Narveson, Equality vs. Liberty: Advantage, Liberty, Soc.
PHIL. & POL'Y, Autumn 1984, at 33, 50-52. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its
Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 775-82 (1986)
(describing dispute between conservatives and liberals about conceptions of formal and
substantive liberty).
The political far left has also attacked liberals for using the distinction. See, e.g.,
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 580 (1982)
("merely formal" v. "substantive" freedom). I plead guilty and accuse the Crits of
improperly throwing stones. For a look into their glass house, see, e.g., ROBERTO M.
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 187 (1975); Kennedy, supra, at 621 (using idea
without label). The key question, arguably, is whether the distinction is meaningful and
useful and not only a fashionable rhetorical device to hide special pleading. Nor, to
satisfy this standard, must the distinction answer all criticism. What normative theory
does?
5. Calabresi anticipated this line of reasoning. Discussing products liability he
noted:
People in some ways like to protect themselves against themselves. We
may not like this, but it is a recurring phenomenon.... There is at least
one sense in which a system of liability rules may be this kind of thing, a
protection designed at a calm moment. When I go into a polling booth I
may not want all people to have to do certain things. But I may want
them to force me, perhaps, to buy medical insurance, even though as a
result I force other people who may not want it. The majority of us
require this because we find it necessary to protect ourselves against a
later moment when the trip to Florida looks like an awfully good idea.
Edited Transcript of AALS-AEA Conference on Products Liability, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 117, 135-
36 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1970) [hereinafter Transcript] (comments of Guido Calabresi);
see also BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 72-74 (1965) (discussing invocation of state
to help oneself modify one's own taste or character); GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS,
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The concept of self-paternalism is the crux of this article.6 To
advance the main thesis, self-paternalism must first be delineated,
defended and distinguished from paternalism. 7 Basically, self-pater-
ATrTUDES, AND THE LAw 12-13 (1985) (recognizing role of self-paternalism in tort law).
Calabresi is "not quite sure how you handle this ... It is not that these people are
incompetent; it is that they themselves will vote to protect themselves against a subse-
quent incompetence." Transcript, supra, at 136. I hope to point towards ways to handle
this.
6. Self-paternalism is also called, among other things, precommitment, self-
command and self-management. One of the leading commentators, having written on
the topic numerous times, is the economist Thomas Schelling. "When the values that
govern one's preferences are liable to displacement by values that one deprecates, we
need in addition [to decision theory] something that we might call command theory -
the theory of self-command, or self-management." Thomas C. Schelling, Ethics, Law,
and the Exercise of Self-Command, in 4 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 43, 47
(Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1983) (emphasis and footnote omitted) [hereinafter
Schelling, Ethics, Law, and Self-Command]. Schelling includes among the familiar cases
calling for self-command: "the person [who] just doesn't seem to be all there" (e.g.,
getting up in the morning); overstimulation or exhilaration; passion or infatuation;
capture or captivation; phobias, panic, and extreme terror; and, perserverance. Id. at
52-55. Schelling recognized that many consumer problems can be addressed by self-
management. See Thomas C. Schelling, The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, 60 PUB.
INTEREST 94, 112 (1980) (regarding consumer ignorance, budgeti;ig, wise spending and
misleading advertising). Precommitment may be rational strategic behavior to cope with
conflict, including internal conflict. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF
CONFLICT 18-19 (1960) [hereinafter SCHELLING, CONFLICT].
John Cirace, an economist-lawyer who kindly commented on a draft of this article,
suggested I adopt Schelling's terminology and approach.
[Ilt is specifically set in a context of strategic conflict concerning bargains,
so it is set in the context of economics in general and game theory in
particular; it specifically deals with indeterminate situations; and it has
none of the negative baggage associated with the idea of paternalism....
Moreover, self-paternalism is self-referential, whereas an irrevocable
commitment or precommitment in the context of bargains makes clear
that the rationale for the action is not so much to discipline one's self but
to keep another from taking advantage of one in a bargaining situation.
Letter fromJohn Cirace to Bailey Kuklin (n.d.). His points are well made. My continued
primary reliance on the terminology of self-paternalism springs from the fact that my
documentation is largely from the literatures of law and philosophy, which are mainly in
terms of self-paternalism and paternalism.
7. The distinction is important for political reasons. The political right obviously
has few good things to say about paternalism. But see infra note 198. The far left is also
critical. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 4. Kennedy, however, despite his criticism of the
"liberal agenda," redressed the agenda into the "respectable" robes of "ad hoc
paternalism" and then proclaimed it for the Crits, though cautiously. See id. at 624-49.
Ultimately, his espousal of paternalism and mine of self-paternalism have significant
similarities, see, e.g., id. at 640, though I believe self-paternalism is easier to justify, and is
fully justificatory irrespective of whether paternalism is a subconscious or hidden
motive. See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 19, 23 (Rolf Sartorius ed.,
1983). For other defenders of paternalism, see, e.g., THOMAS C. GREY, THE LEGAL
ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY 24-25 (1983) (discussing "antiexploitative" paternalistic
intervention); JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM Xi (1984) (arguing that "there is some room
in liberalism for paternalistically motivated constraints"); Dworkin, supra, at 27-28
("Paternalism is justified only to preserve a wider range of freedom for the individual in
SELF-PATERNALISM
nalism is the prior restraint of oneself for one's own good,8 whereas
paternalism is the restraint of another person for her own good.9
question."); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763,
766-97 (1983) (presenting notion of paternalism justified by economic efficiency and
distributive fairness, personal integrity, and "notion of sound judgment"); David L.
Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein,
Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1138-69 (1986) (giving
"four basic categories of cases in which interference with a system of private
consumption choices is justified . . . . sometimes understood as species of
paternalism' ").
8. Elster listed and discussed five (tentative) criteria for self-paternalism:
(i) To bind oneself is to carry out a certain decision at time t, in order to
increase the probability that one will carry out another decision at time t2 .
(ii) If the act at the earlier time has the effect of inducing a change in the
set of options that will be available at the later time, then this does not
count as binding oneself if the new feasible set includes the old one.
(iii) The effect of carrying out the decision at t, must be to set up some
causal process in the external world. (iv) The resistance against carrying
out the decision at t, must be smaller than the resistance that would have
opposed the carrying out of the decision at t, had the decision at t not
intervened. (v) The act of binding oneself must be an act of commission,
not of omission.
JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 39-47 (rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter ELSTER,
ULYSSES]. He summarized the gamut of discussed strategies of precommitment. See id.
at 103-05; Jon Elster, Weakness of Will and the Free-Rider Problem, 1 ECON. & PHIL. 231, 256-
62 (1985); see also George Ainslie, Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and
Impulse Control, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 463, 473-89 (1975) (presenting devices for control-
ling impulses, with applications); Thomas Schelling, Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and
in a Theory of Rational Choice, 74 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 1, 6-7 (1984); Robert
E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Be-
tween Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 329, 342-47
(1986). Even animals precommit themselves. See Jon Elster, Introduction, in RATIONAL
CHOICE 1, 3 (Jon Elster ed., 1986) [hereinafter Elster, Introduction]. Psychologists have
discussed precommitment devices in terms of defense or coping mechanisms. Four dis-
tinct strategies appear in the literature: extrapsychic devices; control of attention; con-
trol of emotion; and private rules. See George Ainslie, Beyond Microeconomics. Conflict
Among Interests in a Multiple Self as a Determinant of Value, in THE MULTIPLE SELF 133, 144-
46 (Jon Elster ed., 1986); see also ELSTER, ULYSSES, supra, at 37 (discussing similar alter-
natives to self-paternalism). The first strategy is embraced here. The effectiveness of
the others has been queried: "I would not deny that some degree of self-control can be
achieved simply by pulling yourself up by the bootstraps, but as is argued below more
durable results are achieved by acting on the environment." ELSTER, ULYSSES, supra.
9. Kleinig defined paternalism: "X acts paternalistically in regard to Y to the extent
that X, in order to secure Y's good, as an end, imposes upon Y." KLEINIG, supra note 7,
at 13. For other definitions, see, e.g., Bernard Gert & Charles M. Culver, TheJustification
of Paternalism, 89 ETHICS 199, 199 (1979); Kronman, supra note 7, at 763; Shapiro, supra
note 7, at 522-25. Diverse forms of paternalism are possible: strong and weak, positive
and negative, active and passive, and direct and indirect. See KLEINIG, supra, at 14. For
the idea that paternalism entails neither coercion nor interference with liberty of action,
see id. at 6-7; Bernard Gert & Charles M. Culver, Paternalistic Behavior, 6 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 45, 45-47 (1976). Overall, legal paternalism, "even when conjoined with other
principles.... has at best a very limited conception of personal autonomy. Even though
it is consistent with the recognition of a person's right of self-determination, it
19921 655
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For the beginning tasks of delineation and distinction, I put the
reasoning for self-paternalism into a series of internal monologues.
These monologues show self-paternalism in its clearest manifesta-
tion, and they demonstrate the ways in which it can verge into pater-
nalism. ' 0 To draw upon the classic example of self-paternalism, the
first internal monologue is ascribed to Odysseus as he muses on
what to do about the approaching, irresistible songs of the Sirens.
He desires to hear the songs, and yet he knows that, if he does, self-
destructive temptations will overwhelm him. In order to solve the
quandary, Odysseus, the shrewd one, "peer of Zeus in strata-
gems,"1 1I says to himself in a moment of cool reflection: "To safely
relish their songs, beforehand I will prevent myself from suc-
cumbing to an irrational impulse by ordering my crew to bind me to
the mast and ignore my later commands to the contrary."' 2 On par-
subordinates that right to the person's own good." FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 4,
at 57.
10. The borderline between paternalism and self-paternalism is fragile. Feinberg
discussed "soft paternalism", which may not be " 'paternalistic' at all, in any clear
sense":
Soft paternalism holds that the state has the right to prevent self-
regarding harmful conduct (so far it looks 'paternalistic') when but only
when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary, or when temporary
intervention is necessary to establish whether it is voluntary or not.... In
the two-party case ..... [t]o the extent that B's consent is not fully
voluntary, the law is justified in intervening 'for his sake' .... After all, to
whatever extent B's apparent choice stems from ignorance, coercion,
derangement, drugs, or other voluntariness-vitiating factors, there are
grounds for suspecting that it does not come from his own will, and
might be as alien to him as the choices of someone else."
FEINBERG, supra note 4, at 12 (emphasis omitted). Kleinig's contrast of strong and weak
paternalism is similar: "[An imposition is strongly paternalistic if, in order to secure Y's
good, X imposes upon Y without considering Y's capacity to choose that good for him-
or herself. It is weakly paternalistic, however, if X's imposition is premised upon Y's
incapacity to make that choice." KLEINIG, supra note 7, at 14. See also Dworkin, supra
note 7, at 21 (discussing fact that legislation requiring information to be divulged, e.g., a
truth-in-advertising act, is not paternalistic).
11. HOMER, THE ILIAD 40 (R. Fitzgerald trans., Anchor Press/Doubleday eds. 1975).
12. Rational choice may be distinguished from willful action, that is, actor from act.
See, e.g., Kuklin, supra note 2, at 896-903. Elster, while discussing this classic example of
self-paternalism, blurred the distinction when he declares that "Ulysses was not fully
rational" since he had "to resort to this device." ELSTER, ULYSSES, supra note 8, at 36.
That Odysseus "was not fully rational" has been challenged, see David Gauthier,
Morality, Rational Choice, and Semantic Representation, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1988, at
173, 207-08 (distinguishing myopic Ulysses (the succumber), sophisticated Ulysses (the
self-paternalizer), and resolute Ulysses (the resister)), as has been the implication that
Odysseus, while under the enticements of the Sirens, was irrational, see Donald C.
Hubin, Of Bindings and By-Products: Elster on Rationality, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 82, 84-85
(1986) ("It is not only our future irrationality we might wish to protect ourselves from,
but our future rationality as well."). Self-paternalism, according to Elster, is binding
oneself as "a privileged way of resolving the problem of weakness of will." ELSTER,
supra, at 37.
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allel reasoning, a chronic alcoholic upon sober contemplation may
vote for declaring incompetent those who enter contracts while
under the influence of drugs.' 3 Similar reasoning controls periodi-
cally recurring mental illness.' 4 Analogous rationales may underlie
the law of contracts and the morality of promise-keeping,' 5 and
even motorcycle helmet and seatbelt laws, among others.' 6 In each
13. See CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 13. Calabresi expressed concern for the thwarted
drunks "who are superb negotiators when seven sheets to the wind [sic]." Id.
14. See ELSTER, ULYSSES, supra note 8, at 38; JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Incompetence and
Paternalism, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 165, 176 (1979) (discussing rationally
self-chosen "paternalism"); see generally Rebecca S. Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists: A
Legal and Policy Analysis of the Voluntary Commitment Contract, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
777 (1982). The denial of the right to enter into a self-paternalistic commitment
contract, adequately safeguarded, is paternalistic. See id. at 783. The key is the adequacy
of the safeguards. Dresser doubted they are possible. See id. at 826-54.
Rawls extended this reasoning to mental illness in general, and beyond. First, he
pointed out that "In the original position the parties assume that in society they are
rational and able to manage their own affairs." RAWLS, supra note 4, at 248. Then,
overlooking the hypothetically self-imposed aspect of the constraints, he expressed the
next step in terms of paternalism rather than self-paternalism: "Thus the principles of
paternalism are those that the parties would acknowledge in the original position to
protect themselves against the weaknesses and infirmities of their reason and will in
society." Id. at 249.
15. See, e.g., P.S. ATYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 31 (1981) ("[Ilt is important to
appreciate - as Hume stressed - that in most cases self-interest renders it desirable
that one should be able to bind oneself by giving a promise, and even that one should be
threatened with sanctions to compel compliance."); RAWLS, supra note 4, at 347 ("The
practice of promising exists for precisely this purpose [of gaining the benefit of
cooperation from others]; and so while we normally think of moral requirements as
bonds laid upon us, they are sometimes deliberately self-imposed for our advantage.").
All moral constraints, for that matter, may be principles of rational choice. See DAVID
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986). For criticism, see Symposium on David
Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, 97 ETHICS 715 (1987); see generally Symposium on
Rationality and Morality, 96 ETHICS 5 (1985). The relationship between self-command
and promise-keeping, including enforceable promises, was analyzed in Scott, supra note
8, at 353-61.
16. "[T]here is some evidence indicating that a good proportion of those who fail to
wear belts or helmets favor being made to do so." KLEINIG, supra note 7, at 85. While
Kleinig urged caution in using this finding as a basis for paternalistic intervention, see id.
at 85-86, Feinberg argued that such restrictions can be seen as nonpaternalistic, see
Feinberg, Autonomy, supra note 4.
One can imagine the support of other types of laws by reasoning with self-paternalistic
overtones. For example, take the environmentalist president of a company in a
contaminating industry. She prefers to clean up her plant's emissions, but then she
would lose market share to dirty competitors and dissatisfy self-interested investors.
Legislation mandating the clean-up provides her with the justification to do as she
wishes. Even bankruptcy law may be defended in terms of self-paternalism. See Thomas
H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1408-10
(1985). According to Jackson, "If individuals cannot control the[ir] impuls[ive behavior]
themselves, they may want the assistance of a socially imposed rule [e.g., a nonwaivable
right of discharge in bankruptcy], one that will simply enforce the hypothesized
decisions of their fully rational selves." Id. at 1409. Feinberg discussed self-paternalistic
coercive rules of private groups by using the example of the prohibition of anabolic
19921 657
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case, the actor protects herself by establishing self-constraining con-
ditions prior to the time of entering the marketplace, the highway,
etc.
The position of Odysseus is similar to that of a consumer reflect-
ing on the differential conditions of responsibility in the market-
place. She knows she must enter the marketplace where its Sirens
await. To protect herself against her own irrational decisionmaking,
she opts beforehand for constraints.' 7 Because she consents to the
constraints, she is neither harmed nor wronged.' 8 Yet one must re-
strain the path of this reasoning. When one contemplates the full
range of irrational choices, and when restrictions justified as rational
self-restraints threaten to become pervasive, self-paternalism begins
to take on the appearance of paternalism.' 9 At some point, the solil-
steroids by the International Olympic Committee, which ends up making everyone
better off once there are assurances that others will conform. See JOEL FEINBERG,
HARMLESS WRONGDOING 316-17 (1988).
17. Unlike Odysseus who freely chose a market in luxury goods, the consumer must
enter the market at least for necessaries. Rope and wax are not solutions.
18. See JOEL FEINBERG, Legal Paternalism, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND THE BOUNDS OF
LIBERTY 110, 113-14 (1980). Self-paternalistic restraints, in light of their consent aspect,
have been analogized to a contract between one's present and future selves. This
contract metaphor must be extended carefully, "for the very simple reason that the two
people involved never exist simultaneously. . . . In place of contract, we have the
imposition of a rule or constraint on the future self by the present self - the future self
never signs on with those rules." Gordon G. Winston, The Reasons for Being of Two Minds:
A Comment on Schellings "Enforcing Rules on Oneself", 1J.L., ECON. & ORG. 375, 378 (1985).
Hence, Winston concluded, a closer analogy is to criminal law where rules are imposed
regardless of consent. Id. I balk at this last step; it overly dissociates the present and
future selves, that is, the psychological connectedness or continuity requisite to
personhood, and therefore to autonomous, rational choice. See infra note 24. For a
discussion regarding present desires with a future object, see generally THOMAS NAGEL,
THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 27-76 (1970).
But, as the examples in the text reveal, not all consumers actually consent to the self-
paternalistic restrictions, some for the very reason that they are irrational. The consent
is conjectural, and hence controversial. See infra note 23. This consent argument is
undeniably a weak link in my chain of reasoning. Some strengthening may result by
extrapolating from Coleman's contention that, while a person does not consent to
particular losses, as a rational person she would opt for the Kaldor-Hicks criterion at the
level of social choice. "The justification of particular losses is a matter of fairness, not
consent. The principle of consent would apply to the justification of the institutions, the
principle of fairness to individual losses." Jules Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic
Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner's The Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV.
1105, 1127 (1982). The neutral dialogue below addresses the fairness question.
19. Kennedy argued that the motivation of the decisionmaker determines whether an
action is distributive, paternalistic or a matter of efficiency. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at
570-71. My motives are mixed, being distributive in the promotion of the fortune of
those who have been taken advantage of by others; see Kuklin, supra note 2, at 1006-07,
[self-]paternalistic in the attempt to get myself to act in my own real interests, and, by
advancing the imposition of a warranty offering, see infra section V at 46, cognitive of
efficiency, as Kennedy recognized, see Kennedy, supra, at 573.. Kennedy acknowledged
that some fidging may be required in the distinctions. see id. at 573-74, and Kleinig
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oquy about self-paternalism should become a dialogue about
paternalism. 20
To make this clearer, suppose our contemplator muses on contin-
gencies remote from herself. She rarely imbibes to drunkenness,
perhaps she never has, but she has seen the state of those who have
and realizes that she also would be an easy mark should she overdo
it. Therefore, she says to herself in words identical to those of the
chronic alcoholic: "To protect myself from irrational decisions when
I am inebriated, I opt for the doctrine of legal incompetence for
intoxication." The internal monologue is entirely self-interested
without a thought to paternalize others who succumb to the liquid
drug.
Then our contemplator muses further on decisionmaking in the
marketplace. She recognizes that distortions and asymmetries in
the marketplace are pervasive. Complications of choice enter nearly
every transactional arena, especially those involving risk and uncer-
tainty, but she does not want to create so many new rules that her
freedom is overly constrained. While this muser may be a well-edu-
cated professional, she realizes the magnitude of the transactional
disadvantage she would suffer if she were unable to utilize her well-
honed gifts of nature and nurture.2' Thus she says to herself:
"When I am in the position of being unduly confounded by the
underscored the difficulty of discerning the motives behind consumer protection
legislation, see KLEINIG, supra note 7, ch. 7. "[P]erhaps the key question concerns
whether legislation of a certain kind requires recourse to paternalistic considerations if it
is to be justified." Id. at 178. Mandatory warranty offerings do not lead inevitably to
paternalistic considerations. For more on the motives for government action, see infra
note 151. Whether the decisionmaker's motives are relevant can be challenged. See
G.E. MOORE, ETHICS 79-80 (1912) (arguing that motive may be relevant to judgments of
whether actor deserves blame or praise, but whether action is right or wrong depends
on consequences, never on motive).
20. Struggling with the fuzziness at the margin between paternalism and self-
paternalism, Schelling raised the "contractual approach to social obligation" whereby a
legislator decides paternalistic questions relating to how much should be required to be
spent on seatbelts, smoke alarms, etc., by deciding how much she would spend on these
items for herself. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, Economic Reasoning and the Ethics of Policy, in
CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 1, 10 (1984). Schelling stated, "The question still may not
be easy, but it is less morally intimidating." Id. Moral intimidation arises when the
legislator realizes that the regulated party does not recognize the net value of the
regulation. See Dworkin, supra note 7, at 23.
21. For example, installment credit sales in low income neighborhoods are "marked
by ignorance on the part of the buyer, enticement, the bait of easy terms, fraudulent
practices, shoddy merchandise, unreliable dealers, garnishment and oppressive
collection methods." Homer Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1969). The consumer's knowledge of the product and the business
practices affects her treatment under the Uniform Commercial Code caselaw. See Alan
Schwartz, The Private Law Treatment of Defective Products in Sales Situations, 49 IND. L.J. 8, 33
(1973).
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choices in the marketplace, I now choose to protect myself against
my own irrationality by opting for the legal doctrine of unconsciona-
bility." Again the monologue is in terms of self-interest, but there is
a noticeable difference. The soliloquist has little reason to believe
that she will ever be in a position where the current doctrine of un-
conscionability will apply to her in full force. She is not about to
lose thirty points from her IQ and ten years of education. 22 Her
vote for unconscionability, while applicable across the board, will
affect mainly those from socioeconomic classes less privileged than
her own. The effect on her is greatly attenuated, and, therefore, the
extent of her appreciation of and attention to the repercussions may
be questioned. Although her motivation is purely self-paternalistic,
because of the unlikely personal impact, her monologue smacks of
paternalism. Those for whom the doctrine will have more immedi-
acy will rightfully have something to say about this. Before general
consent to the doctrine is supposed, the monologue should become
a dialogue with them, otherwise self-paternalism is in danger of be-
coming paternalism.23
22. "Socrates can neither recall nor return to the life of the fool . Michael S.
McPherson, Mill's Moral Theory and the Problem of Preference Change, 92 ETHIcs 252, 266
(1982). Unconscionability has applicability for even the most gifted, educated, and
wealthy, as where it is grossly inefficient to resist a standard take-it-or-leave-it provision
involving an event unlikely for her (e.g., a self-help repossession clause).
23. Gewirth discussed this general issue in terms of dispositional or tacit consent:
"For a recipient to give dispositional consent means that he would have unforcedly
acquiesced in a transaction if he had been aware of the relevant circumstances and had
been in an emotionally calm state of mind." ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 259
(1978). Gerald Dworkin advanced this as a defense of paternalism. See Dworkin, supra
note 7, at 28-33. See also Dresser, supra note 14, at 789 ("Consequently, the only
difference between self-paternalism - as represented by the voluntary commitment
contract - and true paternalism is that in the former, the individual has consented to
the future coercion, while in the latter, the state assumes that he or she would consent if
capable.").
Consent arguments can run amuck. One problem with "dispositional consent" is that
"the appeal to dispositional consent may be used in a paternalistic way to justify acting
on recipients without regard for their actual desires or beliefs or occurrent consent (or
dissent)." GEWIRTH, supra, at 260. In criticising hypothetical consent arguments, Sagoff
insisted they are too far-reaching. See Mark Sagoff, Values and Preferences, 96 ETHICS 301,
307 (1986). Sagoff wrote, "An advocate.., might argue that we would surely agree with
him, if only our heads were screwed on right." Id. Feinberg, in discussing consent
arguments, see FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, ch. 22, spurned subsequent
consent, id. at 182-83 ("I would surely have consented"), Rawlsian, hypothetical rational
consent, id. at 184-86, and, generally, consent as inferred psychological states (silent
desires, wishes, etc., as inferred from past behavior or actuarial tables), id. at 181. Yet he
accepted prior consent, id. at 181-82, tacit consent, id. at 183-84, and, sometimes,
dispositional consent, id. at 181. For another discussion of consent-based justifications
of paternalism, see KLEINIG, supra note 7, at 55-67; see generally Onora O'Neill, Between
Consenting Adults, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 252 (1985).
SELF-PATERNALISM
To generalize, the complaints against some of the contemplator's
conclusions are that she cannot be (e.g., cretinism), or be again
(e.g., minority), or is unlikely to be (e.g., unconscionability) in a situ-
ation where the imposed restrictions would be of significant value
directly to herself. The claimed self-paternalism may be ill-consid-
ered or a cover for paternalism. As self-paternalism approaches pa-
ternalism, sharp looks askance become appropriate. But before I
deal with these raised brows, the concept of self-paternalism must
be defended.
III. THE VALUE OF SELF-PATERNALISM
Though self-paternalism may be rational, and while most com-
mentators have mainly good words to say about it, there are reasons
for uneasiness. These reasons are discussed in this section.
To focus the criticism and discussion of self-paternalism, assume
the consumer is contemplating moderate market constraints, such
as a mandatory warranty offering. With this hypothetical as a back-
drop, there are ten relevant criticisms of self-paternalistic action.
First, severe restrictions, whether imposed by others or self-im-
posed, may threaten personhood. 24 Given common assumptions
about autonomy, the nature of a person is to be free, and to lose
that freedom, whether or not later regretted, is to stop being a per-
A related justification for intervention is based upon "retrospective rationality,"
whereby a policy is pursued "so long as there are good grounds for believing that at the
end of the day it will be agreed to have been a good thing." ROBERT E. GOODIN,
POLITICAL THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 41 (1982). See also Dresser, supra, at 789-92
(surveying other justifications, including "Thank You Theory of Paternalistic
Intervention"). Elster objected that the coerced person's preferences are being
seduced. See ELSTER, supra note 8, ch. 11.6; but see GOODIN, supra, at 52-54 (arguing that
seduction objection is weak). Finally, another means to justify apparent paternalism in
terms of self-paternalism is to distinguish "true" preferences from "actual" ones. This
step has been invoked in defense of utilitarianism. See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Morality
and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 55-56 (Amartya
Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982); J.A. Mirrlees, The Economic Uses of Utilitarianism, in
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra, at 63, 68-69. For criticism, see ISAIAH BERLIN, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 131-34 (1969) (presenting idea as
"magical transformation, or sleight of hand"); FEINBERG, supra, at 162-71 (regarding
neurotic preferences); Donald Regan, On Preferences and Promises: A Response to Harsanyi,
96 ETHICS 56, 56-58 (1985).
24. Or the conditions of personhood may not exist when the precommitment falls
due. For example, assuming that psychological connectedness or continuity is a
requisite of personhood, see, e.g., STANLEY I. BENN, A THEORY OF FREEDOM 162-64
(1988); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS ch. 10 (1984), regarding advance
directives for medical care, "the very process that renders the individual incompetent
and brings the advance directive into play can - and indeed often does - destroy the
conditions necessary for her personal identity and thereby undercut entirely the moral
authority of the directive." Allen Buchanan, Advance Directives and the Personal Identity
Problem, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 277, 280 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
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son.2 5 In rebuttal, it should be noted that this argument, smacking
of tautology and essentialism, 26 appears weak when one considers
the basis for giving up this freedom in the context of the market-
place, and the sweep of the freedom rationally relinquished. 27 By
25. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 98 (John
Ladd ed., 1965) (1797) ("No man can bind himself by a contract to the kind of
dependency through which he ceases to be a person, for he can make a contract only
insofar as he is a person."); IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 43-44, 124, 165-68
(Louis Infield trans., 1930); CLARENCE I. LEWIS, The Meaning of Liberty, in VALUES AND
IMPERATIVES 145, 146 (1969). Lewis argued that "Man is born free in the sense that he
discovers himself as an individual in discovering that this ability to act by deliberate
decision belongs to his nature .... He cannot renounce this privilege, and to deprive
him of it is to deny him the right of existence as a person." Id. Kant had a strict view of
this limitation: "It follows that someone can hire himself out only to do work that is
specified both as to kind and amount, either as a day laborer or as a 'live-in' servant."
KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, supra, at 98. On the other hand, Kant
advocated self-imposed restrictions based upon the moral law. He said, for example,
"Freedom and the will's enactment of its own laws are indeed both autonomy - and
therefore are reciprocal concepts .... ." IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS *450 (Howard Paton trans., 3d ed. 1956) (1785) (footnote
omitted). See id. at *431-33. J.S. Mill, the utilitarian, also was concerned about
personhood, though this concern is usually grounded in deontology. See JOHN S. MILL,
On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 81, 213
(1951) (1859). Slavery contracts defeat "the very purpose [i.e., liberty] which is the
justification of allowing [a person] to dispose of himself.... The principle of freedom
cannot require that he should be free not to be free." Id. Mill recognized that the
necessities of life limit wide application of this principle. See id. Mill's principle appears
expansive enough to cover self-paternalism, but for weaknesses in his (and others')
reasoning against paternalism that also apply to self-paternalism, see KLEINIG, supra note
7, at 156-65 (suggesting that Mill may have compromised his position); Margaret Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1902-03 (1987); see generally Feinberg,
Autonomy, supra note 4. The self-imposed restrictions in issue here seem hardly the type
Kant and Mill had in mind and can be rationally justified by the autonomous actor. See
infra note 29. Radin expressed concerns similar to Mills' in terms of "universal
commodification [that] undermines personal identity by conceiving of personal
attributes, relationships, and philosophical and moral commitments as monetizable and
alienable from the self." Radin, supra, at 1905. Therefore, she concluded, "market-
inalienability may attach to things that are personal." Id. at 1906. The worries in this
article are not over personal things. In any event, one must be wary of employing
inalienability for paternalistic reasons. See infra note 55.
26. G. Dworkin and Rawls discerned this. See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism: Some
Second Thoughts, in PATERNALISM, supra note 7, at 105, 111 ("There is nothing in the idea
of autonomy which precludes a person from saying: I want to be the kind of person who
acts at the command of others. I. define myself as a slave and endorse those attitudes
and preferences. My autonomy consists in being a slave.");John Rawls,Justice as Fairness:
Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 232 n.15 (1985) ("It should be
emphasized that a conception of the person, as I understand it here, is a normative
conception, whether legal, political, or moral, or indeed also philosophical or religious,
depending on the overall view to which it belongs.").
27. Feinberg found it consistent with the intentions of the founding fathers that "a
free and autonomous person can renounce and relinquish any right [e.g., the right to
life], provided only that his choice is fully informed, well considered, and uncoerced,
that is to say, fully voluntary." JOEL FEINBERG, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable
Right to Life, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY, 221, 250-51 (1980)
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self-imposing restrictions, one gives up an aspect of freedom in or-
der to enlarge another.2 8 The freedom one chooses to forego is
largely formal and with little material consequence. 29 Indeed, the
(emphasis omitted). Nor is the relinquishment of the right necessarily the abdication of
autonomy. As Kuflik stated in regard to "autonomy-abdication to protect against self-
acknowledged irrationality ..., insofar as the agent's decision is rationally defensible, it
is not actually a decision to abdicate autonomy ...." Arthur Kuflik, The Inalienability of
Autonomy, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 271, 285 (1984). For discussion, see id. at 285-96; John
Rawls, A Well-Ordered Society, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 6, 13 (Peter Laslett &
James Fishkin eds., 5th series 1979). Even if autonomy is abdicated in some sense, this
may be quite justifiable. See, e.g., Nancy L. Rosenblum, Studying Authority: Keeping
Pluralism in Mind, in AUTHORITY REVISITED 102, 112 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1987) (arguing for deference to experts to efficiently achieve complex
technical ends); Joseph Raz, Authority and justification, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 28-29
(1985) (discussing surrender of judgment to another who has demonstrably better
judgment under circumstances: "this surrender of judgment and acceptance of
authority, far from being either irrational or an abdication of moral responsibility, is in
fact the most rational course and the right way to discharge one's responsibilities.").
Wolff pushed this reasoning down the slope: "Indeed, we may wonder whether, in a
complex world of technical expertise, it is ever reasonable not to [give up one's
autonomy]!" ROBERT P. WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 15 (1970). Most recognize
limits. See, e.g., Feinberg, Autonomy, supra note 4; at 475 ("No man can make himself into
a mere instrument of another's will. Even an autonomous agent cannot alienate his
ultimate accountability [presumably, even if it is rational to do so].").
28. Giving oneself over to another's authority (in this case, one's prior self) is not
necessarily a sacrifice of (later) autonomy.
Inclinations toward obedience and submission to authority
unquestionably have good effects - one of which is that they make
possible the development of the egoistic, autonomous self .... It would
be difficult or impossible to become meaningfully autonomous if we were
not inclined to subordinate our own will to the dominant will of someone
we trust or respect, [as for example, to a piano teacher].
Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political
Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 402 (1985). Obviously,
this can go too far. Regarding self-imposed restraints, for instance, West referred to
Kafka's "hunger artist" who, exercising an "empty freedom," starved himself to death.
"[H]is refusal to compromise the sovereignty of his present desire for pure self-control
ultimately denies the welfare - indeed the existence - of his future self." Id. at 394.
29. For a discussion of the material and formal freedom distinction, see supra note 4
and accompanying text. Facing take-it-or-leave-it contracts, the consumer is usually a
"contract term taker," rather than a bargainer. See Victor Goldberg, Institutional Change
and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 72, 72 (Anthony T.
Kronman & Richard A. Posner eds., 1979). Before going on, one might ask, "What's so
hot about freedom?" Feinberg responded that freedom is a good, but only "one kind of
good among many." FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 65. "The de jure
autonomous person will surely reserve the right to 'trade off' his defacto freedoms for
goods of other kinds, as measured on his own scale of values and determined by his own
judgment." Id. Feinberg rejected the alleged paradox of the morally autonomous
person who diminishes his own defacto freedom. See id. Following Mill and the liberal
tradition,
respect for a person's autonomy is respect for his unfettered voluntary
choice as the sole rightful determinant of his actions except where the
interests of others need protection from him .... A perfectly autonomous
person would have in Mill's words the 'power of voluntarily disposing of
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effect of foregoing this freedom is to expand one's power in the
marketplace and advantageously affect distributions of material
wealth. As a practical matter, the overall breadth of the consumer's
freedom is increased.30
Second, one may precommit oneself to a plan that later is cause
for regret,3 l not because the commitment was foolish at the time,3 2
his own lot in life,' even if that involved forfeiting his de facto freedom in
the future.
Id. at 68-69 (emphasis omitted). To take the final step against freedom of sorts: "One
might argue that having to make decisions on all those items to be consumed is, itself, an
infringement of our liberty. As Moore argues, 'A very precious part of human freedom
is that not to make decisions .... ' " Alan Wertheimer, Disrespect for Law and the Case for
Anarchy, in ANARCHISM 167, 187 n.22 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1978) (citing BARRINGTON MOORE, REFLECTIONS ON THE CAUSES OF HUMAN MISERY 68-69
(1970)).
30. The risks of limiting one's future options may be overstated: "I offer the
personal judgment that, by and large, people are more in need of greater efficacy in
devising rules for their own behavior than in danger of shortsighted self-binding
activity." Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, I J.L., ECON. & ORG. 357, 360
(1985). For discussion of when greater choice may be worse for the individual, see
Russel Hardin, The Utilitarian Logic of Liberalism, 97 ETHICS 47, 58-62 (1986) (giving
example of duel prohibition or coed dormitory curfew); Arthur Kuflik, The Utilitarian
Logic of Inalienable Rights, 97 ETHICS 75, 86 (1986) (giving example of inalienable right to
sue for divorce); see generally SCHELLING, CONFLICT, supra note 6. A hint of paradox can
be heard: "Placing value on allowing people to make choices - to act free of restraint -
leads to placing value on not freeing persons of the consequences of their choices,
Freeing them of such consequences would undo the choice and in significant ways would
retroactively deprive them of the power of choice." Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract:
Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 340, 356 (1983).
31. First, a caveat:
Even in the cases where the person subsequently regrets his choice, he
may not regret that he had not been forcibly prevented from making it.
There must be a right to err, to be mistaken, to decide foolishly, to take
big risks, if there is to be any meaningful self-rule ....
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 62. Rawls argued against the rationality of
regret or self-reproach, since the actor "does what seems best at the time, and if his
beliefs later prove to be mistaken with untoward results, it is through no fault of his
own." RAWLS, supra note 4, at 422 (presenting "deliberative rationality"). Along these
lines, Kronman distinguished between disappointment and regret, disappointment oc-
curring when things do not work out as wished, and regret "[w]hen a person wishes that
he had not made a particular contract because his goals have changed .... " Kronman,
supra note 7, at 780. Regret, unlike disappointment, often "underminets] a person's
confidence in the rationality of his own choices," id., and may be especially demoralizing
when the person, unable to empathize with his prior values, believes he has betrayed
himself, see id. at 781-82. As Rawls, under "deliberative rationality," put it: "The person
at one time, so to speak, must not be able to complain about actions of the person at
another time." RAWLS, supra, at 423. Perhaps this is the Golden Rule, but upside down.
See Derek Parfit, Comments, 96 ETHICS 832, 833 n.3 (1986) ("We ought not to do to our
future selves what it would be wrong to do to other people."). Or perhaps it is the
Aristotelian mandate "to be a friend to himself." Kronman, supra, at 782.
32. On the other hand, it may have been wrong at the time. See Mark Kelman, Choice
and Utility, 1979 WIs. L. REV. 769, 785 ("The regretting person does not only claim that
he has come to prefer lollipops, but he feels that he latently preferred them all along.").
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but because the person changes and no longer has the same prefer-
ences or value system.33 This plan might jeopardize the person's
integrity or self-respect.3 4 While the moderate constraints contem-
plated here hardly seem to amount to an infringement of the self-
paternalizer's personhood, nevertheless, she may later view differ-
ently the merits of the precommitment. Yet the consumer's second
thoughts, in light of the modesty of the constraints, are unlikely to
elevate the regret to the level where it threatens integrity or self-
respect.35 For example, who would think of the consumer as less of
a person because she must be offered a warranty?
See also id. at 784-87 (discussing neoclassical economic model's failure to account for
"wrong" purchase choices). When conflicting with a later decision, the earlier decision
may be presumed to be wrong, since "[tihe agent is likely to have more information and
to have had more time to reflect on her goals." Donald H. Regan, Paternalism, Freedom,
Identity, and Commitment, in PATERNALISM, supra note 7, at 113, 129.
33. Whether or not regretted, preference changes may undermine the value of prior
self-commitments. See generally RICHARD M. HARE, MORAL THINKING 101-06 (1981)
(differentiating "now-for-now," "now-for-then," and "then-for-then" preferences). The
chooser may become "a different person," see, e.g., PARFIT, supra note 24, at 327-29;
Regan, supra note 32, at 125; R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility
Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165, 173 (1955); but see FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF,
supra note 4, at 83-87; Elster, Introduction, in THE MULTIPLE SELF, supra note 8, at 1, 13-
14; Feinberg, supra note 4, at 479-83, and therefore not responsible for prior choices, see
STANLEY I. BENN & RICHARD S. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 240
(1959). Yet identity may not turn on value changes alone, since one's values commonly
are in flux and contradiction. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, OBJECTIVITY IN SOCIAL RESEARCH 16
(1969); Kuklin, supra note 2, at 983 n.299; see also GOODIN, supra note 23, at 41-47
(discussing periodic preference changes); Winston, supra note 18, at 377-78 (discussing
causes of internal preference conflicts); but cf. MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY
103 (1984) (arguing that law presumes person's desires are somewhat consistent and
transitively ordered over time). Furthermore, if the preferences of the "new" person are
given precedence, the "old" person evades the responsibility for her prior voluntary
commitments. See FEINBERG, supra, at 86-87. Whether the reasons for changing one's
preferences are good or bad is relevant. Cf Winston, supra, at 377 ("Indeed a
presumption of a general worsening of preferences is necessary before we can safely
side with the present self and promote the success of all its rulemaking over the future
self."). The problems are in distinguishing and discerning the reasons. See ELSTER,
ULYSSES, supra note 8, at 147-50; Feinberg, supra, at 475-79. Behavioral and economic
studies of uncertain future preferences have begun. See, e.g., James G. March, Bounded
Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, in RATIONAL CHOICE, supra note 8, at
142 (presenting behavioral study on how preferences are processed in choice behavior);
PeterJ. Hammond, Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 159
(1976). Possibly, one may engineer one's preference changes, see March, supra, at 158-
62 (indicating that engineering of choice behavior can be achieved once conceptual and
optimization problems are overcome), or develop strategies to cope with them, see
ELSTER, ULYSSES, supra, at 72-73. But Kronman, because of the difficulties, rejected the
economic analysis which monetizes the risk of change in values. See Kronman, supra note
7, at 782 n.64.
34. See Kronman, supra note 7, at 780. For the requisites of self-respect, see Joseph
Raz, Liberating Duties, 8 LAW & PHIL. 3, 15 (1989).
35. The dilemmas from preference changes still remain. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 196-98 (1980) (stating that dilemmas arise in
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Third, by restricting beforehand one's foolishness, one may be
prevented from fully experimenting and learning from mistakes.
The moral fiber exercised by hard-nosed give and take may be inad-
equately strengthened if there are fewer rounds in the ring.3 6 Be
that as it may, whether one learns from mistakes, or learns in time,
or at an undue cost, depends on the situation. 37 One must not for-
get that in the marketplace the match is fixed. The merchant wears
weighted gloves. Although a battering now and then may improve
the consumer's grit and mettle, regular batterings may simply wear
evaluating whether person who gives his knowing and explicit consent to contract
should always be held to its terms even though his preferences have changed). For
example, while "free persons conceive of themselves as beings who can revise and alter
their final ends and who give first priority to preserving their liberty in these matters,"
John Rawls, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, 88 QJ. ECON. 633, 641 (1974), especially
since it may be difficult to fully appreciate one's preferences under hypothetical
circumstances before one has experienced them, see Frank Hahn, On Some Difficulties of the
Utilitarian Economist, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra note 23, at 187, 191-93
(noting that one may be wrong in evaluation of alternative selves, having never
experienced proposed alternative), nonetheless, not second-guessing the
precommitment may make it easier for all parties affected, as in regard to that of a
patient in extremis, see Thomas C. Schelling, Strategic Relationships in Dying, in CHOICE AND
CONSEQUENCE, supra note 20, at 147, 153-55 ("[Fireedom of choice is not always
welcome.").
36. Mill mustered this "moral muscles argument" to attack paternalism. See MILL,
supra note 25, at 156 ("The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative
feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a
choice."). See also JOHN S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY bk. V, ch. XI, § 2
(1st ed. 1848) (arguing that restrictions on individual action "starve the development of
some portion of the bodily or mental faculties."); WILLIAM GODWIN, ENQUIRY
CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE 276 (K. Codell Carter ed., 1971) (1793) ("As long as a
man is held in the trammels of obedience, and habituated to look to some foreign
guidance for the direction of his conduct, his understanding and the vigour of his mind
will sleep."). For modern versions of this concern, see FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 76-77 (1960) (stating that granting responsibility to citizens
for their own actions and interests helps fulfill aim of freedom); KLEINIG, supra note 7, at
26-27; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 640; Rawls, supra note 27, at 13; Regan, supra note 32, at
115-16; Malcolm P. Sharp, Mr. Justice Holmes: Contracts, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 276-78
(1964) (discussing objective test in contracts).
37. See Stanley 1. Benn, Persons and Values: Reasons in Conflict and Moral Disagreement, 95
ETHICS 20, 29-30 (1984) (arguing that while persons are entitled to make mistakes based
on their own choices, under some conditions, value-centered reasons justify restricting
their pursuit of what they choose). "But we do not learn from all our mistakes, or not
without excessive costs being exacted." KLEINIG, supra note 7, at 189. After pointing
out that required minimum standards for choices do not eliminate mistakes, rather they
reduce the likelihood "where those who choose badly would probably suffer
disproportionately," Kleinig concluded: "With many items, particularly those that are
more expensive, repeat buying is unlikely and the 'lesson' will come too late." Id.
Schelling doubted the character-building argument in general: "I have heard
expressions of concern that struggle builds character and the merchandising of 'instant
self-control' will weaken the human spirit. I acknowledge the possibility but cannot help
comparing the argument to a similar argument we used to hear against taking the pain
out of childbirth." Schelling, Ethics, Lau, and Self-Command, supra note 6, at 7 1.
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her down with frustration, especially when she realizes that she can-
not rationally overcome the merchant's advantage once she enters
the arena. This is not the type of case where self-paternalism be-
comes superfluous through experience and practice in the
marketplace.38
Fourth, and closely related to the last point, options should be
kept open since, "precisely because the cultivation of true moral val-
ues and of true virtue depends on self-discipline rather than exter-
nal discipline, it requires liberty of choice."'3 9 A precommitment
calling upon the assistance of third parties may undermine self-dis-
cipline and thwart the goals of moral strength and virtue. Along
with the response to the last point, two thoughts may be offered
against this conclusion. First, the self-imposition of constraints it-
self, when actively initiated by the self-paternalizer, requires self-dis-
cipline. Second, the basic reason the consumer considers
precommitments regarding the marketplace is that, once she recog-
nizes the distortions to rational decisionmaking, she does not find
all that much material liberty of choice. Greater liberty avails the
consumer as she stands back before entering the marketplace. Op-
tions at this point, rather than decisions on the tilted playing field,
may better cultivate true moral values and true virtue.
38. Cf KLEINIG, supra note 7, at 30-31 ("But we can sometimes overdo the exercise
[of our 'moral muscle'] .... ."). The inevitable battering in the unconstrained
marketplace may indeed strengthen the consumer's moral muscle even though she wins
no matches in that setting. The strength, as suggested by the next point, may serve her
in other arenas less one-sided. Insofar as this result is lost, self-paternalism may be
costly. I say, "may be costly," because, before lamenting this loss, one should pause to
evaluate it. Under one view, "although we could come to resist the techniques of
advertisers, it would impoverish us were we to become the sort of person for whom that
was easy. We should not be expected to resist them." Id. at 187; see also infra note 49
(showing societal effects of recognizing certain agreements).
As another scenario, the continual battering may lead to a reaction formation, which
"is the setting up of a more-or-less rigid attitude or character trait which will serve as a
means of preventing the emergence of a painful or undesirable attitude or trait, usually
of the opposite type." ANDREW S. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 167 (rev. ed.
1978) (citation omitted). Or, as implied in the text, the consumer may become
enervated from the lost struggles and lose what strength she has. Again, we reach the
common plaints that the intuitive possibilities are many, the actual effects are a matter of
(unpursued) empiricism, and the promoted values are controversial.
39. Neil MacCormick, Against Moral Disestablishment, in LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL
DEMOCRACY 18, 22 (1982). "This view, despite its obvious roots in Kantian moral
philosophy, is also central to the utilitarian John Stuart Mill's argument in his classical
statement of legal liberalism . I..." ld  at 22-23 (citing H. L. A. Hart and R. Dworkin for
similar propositions). Ironically, moral rules themselves limit freedom, "for moral rules
take conduct out of the realm of preference and free decision." Richard E. Brandt,
Toward a Credible Form iof Utilitarian,nis, in MORAL RULES AND PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES
145, 156 (Baruch A. Brody ed., 1970).
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Fifth, the Aristotelian principle should be advanced, whereby,
"other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their real-
ized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and that this enjoy-
ment increases the more the capacity is realized or the greater its
complexity. ' '40 Excitement, the feeling of self-competence, the
sense of worthwhileness, and self-respect all flow from the princi-
ple.4 1 Precommitment may curtail the exercise of these capacities.
But the problem is unavoidable in the marketplace. Because its im-
perfections are beyond the reach of the rational consumer once she
is there, the exercise of her capacities is already limited. The con-
sumer, mulling over these conditions of narrowed effective choice
and disadvantage, may have feelings antithetical to the principle
such as, to perhaps overstate it, disappointment, incompetence,
pointlessness, and self-disrespect. 42 By reducing beforehand her
disadvantage, she may avoid negative reactions. On a positive note,
the self-implementation of precommitments involves the exercise of
capacities more sophisticated than are typically used for a consumer
purchase. Even with the constraint under consideration, plenty will
remain in making consumer choices on which to exercise realized
(and realizable) capacities. In fact, depending on the features of the
precommitment, there may be more than before. For example,
under the contemplated mandatory warranty offering, the additional
information that springs from the offering will effectively enhance
the consumer's choice. 43
Sixth, there may be other, interrelated standards for individual
conduct, kindred to those above, that should not be compromised
by precommitments. One, individuals "ought to prefer freedom." 44
Against this, I plead by way of confession and avoidance. By self-
paternalising, one trades formal freedom for material freedom. The
value of the trade should be obvious by now. Two and three, one
should choose for oneself,45 and act for oneself.46 The modest
40. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 414. See Neil MacCormick, Legal Right and Social
Democracy, in LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 39, at 1, 11-12 (stating
that capacity to make individual and joint life plans without arbitrary intervention from
others is rewarding exercise of one's practical reasonableness).
41. See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 440-42.
42. See supra note 38 for a discussion of how continual battering of the consumer
may lead to a reaction formation.
43. See infra section V.A.
44. FRANK H. KNIGHT, The Sickness of Liberal Society, in FREEDOM AND REFORM 370, 372
(1947). Notice the undercurrents of paradox and paternalism in this and the following
ideas.
45. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, SOC. PHIL. & POL'',
Autumn 1986, at 179, 191 ("[E]ven if one is doing 'all the right things,' one's life is truly
impoverished if one is not freely choosing to do the right things.").
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precommitments considered here, certainly insofar as they are self-
chosen and self-achieved, do not run afoul of these principles. A
required warranty offering, for example, does not seem to inhibit
choice or action; arguably, as stated in the paragraph above, it does
quite to the contrary through the concrete presentation of market
information.
Seventh, "[sipontaneity and immediacy are of value in them-
selves" 47 and should be preserved. Against the complaint that self-
paternalism may reduce these qualities, I plead nolo contendere. A
loss of spontaneity and immediacy (in being able to purchase goods
under conditions of asymmetrical rationality) is a cost of self-
paternalism.48
Eighth, the recognition of self-paternalistic agreements may in-
jure third parties, weaken the respect for human dignity, and
"render the whole national character cold and hard."'49 Once more,
for the types of constraints on the table, falling far short of slavery
contracts and the other extremes of primary concern to those who
raise this objection, these risks are negligible. Instead, the public's
refusal to act on its awareness that consumers are systematically dis-
advantaged, even if the refusal stems from a noninterventionist
principle rather than a lack of sympathy, may generate these nega-
46. See Regan, supra note 32, at 116 ("[Wie may not value equally Smith's achieving
her goals with paternalistic help and Smith's achieving her goals on her own. In other
words, we may think there is an important difference between Smith's goals being
achieved and Smith's achieving them.").
47. NAGEL, supra note 18, at 73 ("If spontaneity is a good, then one has reason to
ensure that there will be spontaneity in one's future, not only in the present.").
48. Elster raised this objection by quoting Nagel's words above. See ELSTER,
ULYSSES, supra note 8, at 40-41 ("His [Nagel's] argument is that too much spontaneity
now may reduce the possibilities for spontaneous behaviour later on; my argument is
rather that a strategy for reducing the undesirable consequences of spontaneity may also
reduce the overall amount of spontaneity in my behavior."). Spontaneity, however,
must be properly anchored, since "the sheer desire for novelty ... [or] to be different"
are not good reasons for a preference change. Id. at 148. Furthermore, too much
spontaneity is wantonness, since the very idea of deliberation, a key element of rational
choice, "connotes an activity in which freedom is lost." Harry Frankfurt, Identification and
Wholeheartedness, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 27, 43 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., 1987) (footnote omitted).
49. Feinberg used these words in advancing this argument against the recognition of
slavery contracts and reckless gambles. See FEINBERG, supra note 18, at 123-24;
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 80-81. Calabresi submitted a similar moralism
against the sale of bodily organs, and then pointed out: "Law, unlike economics, is not
concerned only, or even primarily, with reduction of costs, 'given tastes.' It is
fundamentally concerned with shaping tastes." CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 81, 84
(footnote omitted). In the criminal context, Fletcher mentioned the similar downside of
allowing persons to consent to injuries by others: "the social dangers of introducing
others to forms of conduct that the law seeks categorically to discourage." GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 771 (1978).
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tive effects as well. The precommitments may actually decrease in-
juries to some third parties. For example, poor purchasing
decisions presumably have negative spillovers on third parties who
are dependent on the consumer. These spillovers are avoidable
when the consumer is able to make better choices. 50
Ninth, precommitments may bottle-up motivations that reappear
in other, destructive forms. 5' To summarily dispose of this objec-
tion, when directed to plausible self-paternalism in the marketplace,
one. may ask, "What pertinent motivations, or what possible destruc-
tiv manifestations?"
Tenth, self-paternalistic commitments are occasionally made from
misinformation or overreaching. 52 Disallowing the precommit-
ments may be a means to prevent this indirectly when other meth-
ods are infeasible or inefficient. 53 In the marketplace, however, the
other parties with an apparently aligned interest in the self-paternal-
ism have no incentive to induce the consumer to make an unproduc-
tive precommitment. There is no conflict of interest because the
consumer's dependents, if not general supporters, benefit from the
precommitment along with the consumer. 54 The merchant, who
50. Third parties dependent on the merchant may well suffer harm when the
merchant's advantage is reduced. These interests are discussed in the neutral dialogue
below. See dialogue infra section V.B. (projecting viewpoints of self-paternalistic
consumer, merchant, nonconsenting consumer, and society in general).
51. See Robert A. Burt, Commentary on Schellings "Enforcing Rules on Oneself", 1 J.L.,
ECON. & ORG. 381, 381-82 (1985) (presenting "symptom substitution").
52. A person consenting to an extreme self-paternalistic agreement, such as a slavery
contract, is presumptively "incompetent, unfree, or misinformed." FEINBERG, supra note
18, at 122. This is a presumption only, for the slavery contract may be efficient. See
Kronman, supra note 7, at 777 ("If Spartacus agrees to become the slave of Claudius in
return for a guarantee of food, shelter, and education for his children, there is no a
priori basis for thinking the exchange inefficient."). The consenter's "misinformation"
may be about future contingencies, e.g., medical advances. See Buchanan, supra note 24,
at 278-79 ("A second morally relevant difference is that the assumption that a
competent person is the best judge of her own interests is weakened in the case of a
choice about future contingencies under conditions in which those interests have
changed in radical and unforeseen ways."); see also supra note 32 (discussing wrong
commitments). The difficulty is in judging when a presumed irrational commitment is
actually the case, particularly in charged settings. See FEINBERG, supra note 27, at 251.
53. See FEINBERG, supra note 27, at 251;JEFFRIE G. MURPHY &JULEs L. COLEMAN, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 230 (1984) (posing efficiency argument against self-paternalism
through use of inalienability rules); FEINBERG, supra note 18, at 124-25; Kuflik, supra note
30, at 85-86. In other words, "the bar against self-enslavement can be viewed as a
second-best device for preventing certain forms of deception and duress that cannot be
attacked more directly." Kronman, supra note 7, at 777.
54. The problem instead may be underreaching by those protective of the
decisionmaker, not overreaching by adversaries. See Buchanan, supra note 24, at 279:
For when the decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment is a remote and
abstract possibility it is less likely to elicit the same protective responses
that are provoked in family members and health care professionals when
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prefers to discourage the constraint altogether, obviously does have
an incentive to induce the consumer to enter into an irrational
precommitment that enlarges the consumer's disadvantage. But the
consumer is on guard against the merchant's machinations because
such manipulations are among the very reasons for her adoption of
the self-restraint. Furthermore, if government intervention is the
method for implementing the precommitments, then hasty or ill-
conceived moves, if not wholly precluded, are less likely.
By way of summary, the values supporting self-paternalism are
weighty, especially in the context of the marketplace. Counterargu-
ments remain, but they seem outweighed. To disallow the responsi-
ble actor from self-paternalizing is to paternalize her.55
IV. SELF-PATERNALISM IN THE MARKETPLACE
Once the consumer contemplates redressing the differential ra-
tionality in the marketplace by self-paternalistic constraints, ques-
tions arise. Are suitable precommitments realistically achievable? If
so, can they be made and implemented in an acceptable manner,
taking into account justifiable complaints from interested and third
parties? There are common protests against government interven-
tion, but I first examine private remedial approaches in order to see
if one can finesse the critique of intervention.
Before beginning this discussion, a major issue must be settled.
What advantage may the self-paternalizing consumer realistically
demand the merchant to relinquish? That the merchant stop impos-
ing framing distortions by advertisements with famous or attractive
spokespersons? That it fully disclose all relevant facts? That it re-
frain from using ambiguous and incomplete contract terms? Seem-
ingly not, even if these promises could actually be satisfied. Such
constraints would require extensive policing and a means of dispute
resolution, as would comparable legislation. 56 For these types of
they are actually confronted with a human being who they believe can
lead a meaningful life but who chooses to die.
55. See FEINBERG, supra note 18, at 128 ("In fact it would be paternalism to deny
people the liberty of trading liberties for other benefits when they voluntarily choose to
do so."). See also Allen Buchanan, What's So Special About Rights?, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y,
Autumn 1984, at 61, 80 ("Without the ability to waive .... a system of enforceable rights
may itself be paternalistic."); but see Barnett, supra note 45, at 191-93 (defending
inalienability on nonpaternalistic grounds). This leads, again, to an underlying paradox:
"Plato pointed out that it is paradoxical to assert that men are free to act but not free to
give up their freedom. The conflict here is between freedom of choice and freedom to
change one's choices." ScoTr GORDON, WELFARE,JUSTICE, AND FREEDOM 132-33 (1980).
56. Private enforcement via mediation or arbitration keeps the agreement outside
the public realm, assuming the enforcement mechanism itself doesn't break down from
noncooperation. Or, even if the judiciary enforces the private legislation (i.e., contract),
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promises, the administrative costs, to say nothing of uncertainty
costs, appear prohibitive, that is, economically irrational for the pri-
vate consumer.
One possible demand stands out as a way to reduce these compli-
cations. As anticipated by prior comments, the consumer may con-
dition her willingness to deal on the offering by the merchant of a
warranty. While the offering fails to counter some of the sources of
irrationality (e.g., attractive spokespersons can still lead the con-
sumer astray), as detailed below, 57 a warranty internalizes many of
the true costs of the goods in the unequivocal form of a number on
the bottom line (the price tag), thereby reducing the need to collect
data and make calculations. The inherent imperfections of choice
under risk and uncertainty, and the common techniques of
merchants to exacerbate and impose these imperfections, are less
consequential in the presence of this hard data. 58 Still, much of the
consumer's original disadvantage remains because of the ability of
the merchant to occasion distortions through such means as
advertising.
A. Nonbinding Self-Paternalism
One step for the self-paternalizing consumer is to withdraw from
the market and refuse to reenter until the merchant relinquishes
some of its advantage by offering the warranty. The success of this
the state is invoked for a secondary purpose, not the primary one of creating the terms
of the agreement itself. On the other hand, we may move in another direction and
exclude all roles for the state if we take our cues from Nozick who instructs us on the
virtues of private governments ("protective associations"). See ROBERT NozICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ch. 2 (1974) (discussing protective associations as groups
of individuals who join in defending any member or aiding in enforcing her rights).
They also, however, must be administered.
57. See infra section V.A.
58. If proffered warranties are this useful at offsetting differential rationality, it might
be asked why more are appearing in the unregulated marketplace. My arguments imply
that merchants would not wish to offer them for fear of losing their advantage. Let me
speculate about this. Several things have increased consumer awareness of the value of
warranties, thereby encouraging merchants to offer them. One, the courts and
legislatures have been requiring certain warranties, which has increased consumer
experience with them. Two, some warranties are offered by merchants who do not sell
the goods themselves (e.g., from repair service providers and credit card companies),
which gives these merchants an interest in emphasizing the long-term costs of defective
goods. Three, for some time the Japanese and others have been clubbing certain
American industries (e.g., those centered in Detroit) by espousing superior quality,
which has forced the American industries to respond in kind by throwing down the
gauntlet with expanded, publicized warranties. All this suggests that, greater product
complexities aside, there is less differential rationality in the marketplace than there
used to be. Yes, possibly, but much certainly remains, and it still is rational for the
consumer to counter (fairly) however much there is.
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approach turns on the profitability for the merchant of foregoing
this advantage. The merchant who is responsive to the consumer's
tactic will try to give up only as much of its edge as is necessary to
entice the consumer back. Especially before the warranty offering is
in place, it will be difficult for the consumer to estimate its value to
her. The parties will engage in strategic behavior, but the merchant
will be in a better position to maneuver because of the underlying
differential rationality.
Beyond the valuation of the relinquished advantage, there are
other strategic factors which govern the viability of the consumer's
tactic. One factor is the success in conveying to the merchant the
reasons for the individual boycott. Another factor is the success of
demonstrating a strong self-commitment. Once these are accom-
plished the merchant will probably be unable to distinguish accu-
rately a truly boycotting consumer from other consumers. If this is
the case, the merchant may have to give up its advantage over all
consumers in order to induce the boycotter to relent.59 This lowers
the profit margin per transaction, thereby diminishing the attractive-
ness of enticing the boycotter unless an increase in sales offsets the
reduced margin. It appears that one or a few boycotting consumers
are not enough to affect merchant behavior. As a result, the boycot-
ter must convey the reasons for the boycott convincingly to other
consumers as well as to the merchant, and other consumers must
earnestly join it. Under this scenario, what starts off as an individ-
ual, nonbinding tactic rapidly turns into the need for concerted ac-
tion under exacting circumstances. Otherwise, the noise from the
one-woman band will be lost in the din of the marketplace.
In addition to the exacting circumstances for concerted action,
there are other significant limitations to the consumer boycott. If
the goods sought by the consumer are necessities instead of luxury
goods, then the ability of the consumer to decline transactions is
curtailed. 60 The demand for necessities requires another approach.
One suggestion is that the consumer take it upon herself to develop
59. Cf Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 638 (1979) (arguing that
persons who search in market create "pecuniary externality" which protects
nonsearchers from overreaching firms, "because in mass transactions it is usually too
expensive for firms to distinguish among extensive, moderate, and nonsearchers.").
Even if the merchant could distinguish among consumers, surrendering the advantage
to the boycotters may necessarily surrender the advantage to all, for example, via
information production or warranty offering.
60. Kennedy, hypothesizing various market structures, including competition,
demand, and elasticity factors, disputed the distinction between necessaries and
luxuries. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 618-19.
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internal rules and strategies that produce patterns or habits in the
marketplace to cope with the disadvantage. 61 But upon recollection
of the nature of the asymmetry, one cannot be sanguine about this
technique. For example, even when the needed data is available
somewhere, surmounting the information shortfalls by oneself is it-
self typically irrational (i.e., inefficient) because, for all but relatively
expensive goods, the cost of doing this is greater than the payoff.6 2
Furthermore, it is difficult for the consumer to generate sufficient
willpower. Maintaining a diet is an example of the challenge to
one's willpower despite the fact that information about the costs and
benefits of dieting is readily available and ubiquitous (in the mirror,
for example). In contrast, the evaluation of market goods involves
vague probabilistic eventualities and intangible qualities. 63 Gener-
ating the will to act or refrain is difficult enough when hard data is
readily available. Rationalization is too easy when the information is
soft. To summarize without delving further into the problems of sin-
glehandedly overcoming other asymmetries, discretionary individ-
ual strategies seem patently unlikely to be effective. 64
Even with the pledged cooperation of other consumers, optional,
unenforceable efforts seem similarly futile. The experience of the
labor movement suggests that voluntary boycotts, picketing, and
other concerted actions are usually not alone enough to force the
antagonist to negotiate. Organized labor learned that to act as a
united front, even with an amount of solidarity not apparent among
61. See supra note 8. Scott, worried about the unintended secondary effects of
regulation, wrote that self-control may be enough: "The risk of systematic manipulation
by simple framing illusions seems less acute if consumers can routinely develop
behavioral rules to facilitate their decisionmaking." Scott, supra note 8, at 348.
62. See Kuklin, supra note 2, at 952-53. Furthermore, not only is much of the readily
available information exclusively in the possession of the merchant who has an interest
in suppressing some of it (i.e., the bad news), but also information will be under-
produced in any event because, being a public good (i.e., not consumed by use as is, say,
bubble gum), an efficient private market in it will not develop owing to freeriders. Cf
infra note 69 (explaining freeriders).
63. While the Sirens of the marketplace are the weak sisters of the Sirens of the
refrigerator, Scott, after suggesting that self-control may overcome simple framing
illusions, see Scott, supra note 61, conceded: "It may be, of course, that the internal rules
and strategies people use to facilitate their decisionmaking do not have a dominating
effect." Scott, supra note 8, at 347. This is especially likely when one adds the many
other sources of irrationalities. Should one resort to drugs, hypnotism and support
groups, as do dieters?
64. Kennedy stated that, through the profit motive, the invisible hand will work
regarding contract terms even when consumers lack bargaining power, "if both sides
have good information." See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 607-08. My response should be
clear by now. Both sides don't have good information. Even if they did, both sides are
subject to other decisionmaking handicaps, the consumer more than the merchant, that
also hinder the efficient operation of the invisible hand.
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consumers, it must be able to prevent members from dividing off.
In creating this solidarity, the labor movement used the exclusive
bargaining agreement. 65 The rational consumer would consider a
comparable approach.
B. Contractual Self-Paternalism
For consumers to maintain a united front, a private contract may
overcome the defection tendencies intrinsic to nonbinding con-
certed action. I refer not to a contract between the consumer and
the merchant, as would be analogous to the labor movement, for the
disadvantage of the consumer in entering into a contract with the
merchant is the very reason for considering self-paternalistic strate-
gies, but instead to a contract among consumers. Specifically, con-
sumers may agree to a type of no-buy pledge like the ones used by
tenants of apartment buildings being converted into cooperatives or
condominiums. 66 The contracting consumers agree not to do busi-
ness with merchants who refuse to surrender their advantage.
When enough consumers bind themselves, a market demand pre-
sumably will induce some merchants to meet the required terms.
Unfortunately, the tactic of privately adopting joint, binding, self-
paternalistic restrictions is very unlikely to work. As with nonbind-
ing precommitments, the logic of collective action opposes such a
65. See generally ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw ch. XIX (1976)
(discussing principle of exclusive representation and its relationship to duty to bargain
in good faith with majority representative).
66. "The no-buy pledge consists of an agreement among the tenants not to
purchase an apartment in the building [being converted into a
condominium or cooperative] until the tenants' executive committee,
acting on the advice of counsel, votes to accept the offering and release
the tenants from the pledge, or until certain conditions are met.
Patrick A. Rohan & Daniel J. Furlong, The No-Buy Pledge: A Potential Tool for Tenants in a
Condominium Conversion, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 49, 52 (1984). Along with issues of
contractual consideration and mutuality of obligation, a problem with no-buy pledges is
that they smack of restraints of trade. See id. at 55-62. While courts have enforced the
pledges, the law on the issue has not yet matured. Rohan and Furlong predicted that
"Some states may find such pledges to be violative of their common law or statutes,
while other jurisdictions may sustain them, at least where the pledges have not been
tainted by other facts or circumstances." Id. at 66. With respect to the restraint of trade
problem, when the market is not free, when there are disparities in the bargaining pow-
ers of the parties, the legislatures have been willing to intervene. An example of this is
the legislation facilitating the labor movement. This effectively allowed employees to
constrain one another from contracting with the employer, unless the workers' repre-
sentative agrees, thereby creating bargaining leverage to get the employer to accede to
certain demands. See, e.g', National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a)
(West 1978).
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tactic. 67 First, the transaction costs are prohibitive.68 To inform
and convince a sufficiently large number of consumers of the value
of the no-buy agreement is difficult enough without budget con-
straints. In the circumstances under consideration, the budget is
limited in theory by the savings to be garnered from forcing the
merchants to surrender their advantage, and limited in practice by
the amount that can be raised from subscribing consumers, keeping
in mind that the typical consumer misperceives the value of the war-
ranty. Second, there is a substantial freerider problem. 69 Whether
or not a consumer agrees to the no-buy pledge, she acquires the
benefits of the merchant's concession. 70 If the agreement is not
mandatory, why bother to subscribe? In a nutshell, purely private
strategies are not the solution. 71
67. The seminal work in this growing discipline is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).
68. This is one of the "three separate but cumulative factors that keep larger groups
from furthering their own interests." Id. at 48. Specifically, "the larger the number of
members in the group the greater the organization costs, and thus the higher the hurdle
that must be jumped before any of the collective good at all can be obtained." Id. For
the problem in the marketplace, not all the consumers need to be organized to induce
merchants to respond.
69. The freerider problem is: "A barrier to successful collective action or to the
production of a public good that arises because all or some individuals attempt to take a
free ride on the contribution of others." BUCHANAN, supra note 1, at 124.
70. For example, even without purchasing the warranty, the consumer obtains the
information it reveals and the value of the increased quality of the goods it precipitates.
See infra section V.A.
Recently a theory has been forwarded to indicate why freeriding is not as ubiquitous
as the standard theory of collective action predicts. The individual has a sense of
satisfaction from doing her fair share, and thus is willing to pitch in when others might
otherwise cover for her. See HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND
RATIONALITY (1982). Whether this mentality is sufficient to overcome the problems of
collective action in the marketplace is an empirical question. I am skeptical.
71. In sum, "unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless
there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or
group interests." OLSON, supra note 67, at 2 (emphasis omitted); see MARGOLIS, supra
note 70, at 99 ("Hence, the main result of the theory: concentrated economic interests
(typically, producers) will have a political advantage over diffused interests (typically,
consumers)."). The solution has overtones of self-paternalism:
In such cases [of freerider problems], the individuals involved may need
the use of compulsion to give effect to their collective judgment of their
own interest by guaranteeing each individual compliance by the others.
In these cases, compulsion is not used to achieve some benefit that is not
recognized to be a benefit by those concerned, but rather because it is the
only feasible means of achieving some benefit which is recognized as such
by all concerned.
Dworkin, supra note 7, at 23. See Hardin, supra note 30, at 58-59.
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C. Self-Paternalistic Public Intervention
The difficulties of private concerted action force the rational con-
sumer to consider approaching the courts and legislatures for direct
intervention in the name of self-paternalism. 72 This type of govern-
ment support will be more effective than the simple enforcement of
private action via contract. 73 While this move may be second-best,74
it is better than the status quo. 75 The government is open to the
notion of self-paternalism, 76 because the structure of the liberal
72. For the consumer aiming to protect herself, "The natural step is to look to
government intervention; i.e., to invoke the political 'market' instead of the economic
one to correct the latter's alleged imperfections." Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the
Crowd - Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. Prrr. L. REV. 349, 351 (1970)
(footnote omitted). Because of the logic of collective action, "if the rights of collectives
are to be secured, they will commonly have to be secured by state action on behalf of the
affected classes without the kind of general, in-principle agreement that we might expect
to support the simpler dyadic rights of freedom of contract." Hardin, supra note 30, at
69. Once again, this is not (necessarily) paternalism. See ELSTER, ULYSSES, supra note 8,
at 84 ("[I]ndividuals are free to bind themselves (through laws) to bind themselves (with
safety belts), or to protect their 'deeper' values against their more impulsive ones. The
hard problems arise when these restrictions are imposed on the individuals, against their
ex ante facto (and perhaps their ex post facto) preferences.").
73. As in dealing privately with the disadvantage in the marketplace, the logic of
collective action raises formidable obstacles for consumers in gaining adequate
legislative support. Olson stated that:
The only organizations that have the 'selective incentives' available [to
mobilize a latent group, e.g., consumers] are those that (1) have the
authority and capacity to be coercive [e.g., labor unions], or (2) have a
source of positive inducements that they can offer the individuals in a
latent group [e.g., the provision of social or recreational benefits].
OLSON, supra note 67, at 133.
74. "Even when not rational, man knows that he is irrational and can bind himself to
protect himself against the irrationality. This second-best or imperfect rationality takes
care both of reason and of passion." ELSTER, ULYSSES, supra note 8, at Ill (emphasis
omitted). For the neutral dialogue behind the theory of second best, see ACKERMAN,
supra note 35, at 233-34. Perhaps the move is third-best: "Morality is a potential
solution to the problem of market failure." Jody S. Kraus &Jules L. Coleman, Morality
and the Theory of Rational Choice, 97 ETHICS 715, 717 (1987); see also Jules L. Coleman,
Competition and Cooperation, 98 ETHICS 76, 80-81 (1987) (discussing law, politics and
morality as possible solutions to market failure). Undue efforts at seeking the second-
best may lead to the third-best: "[T]o avoid the mistake under second-best conditions,
the statesman must recognize that the quest for the best feasible structure, regardless of
cost, is self-defeating in terms of the liberal ideal itself." ACKERMAN, supra, at 254.
75. It is better, as argued in the next section, owing to efficiency and fairness. In
light of the asymmetry being addressed, perhaps I need not be apologetic about
intervention. One libertarian may be cited in support: "Even the most essential
prerequisite of [an effective competitive system's] proper functioning, the prevention of
fraud and deception (including exploitation of ignorance), provides a great and by no
means yet fully accomplished object of legislative activity." FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, -111E
ROAD TO SERFDOM 39 (1944).
76. In 1929, Pollock justified the legal practice in which a person:
initiate[s] compulsory proceedings against himself: as when, as the law of
some countries now allows, a drunkard enters of his free will a licensed
CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
state relies upon collective precommitments (e.g., periodic elec-
tions). 77 Once the consumer contemplates the step of seeking inter-
vention, she must confront a host of reverberations beyond those
relevant to purely private action. Even though it is obviously ra-
tional for a person to obtain net benefits from the government, the
essential question is whether the government should accede.78
V. THE TRADEOFFS OF SELF-PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION
As a focus for the inquiry of whether the government should
adopt self-paternalistic restraints in the marketplace, I discuss the
pros and cons of the requirement that the merchant offer a warranty
to the consumer. While I have referred to such a rule above, here
the particulars of a warranty requirement are more central to the
discussion. Despite the fact that the rule is on the weak side of pos-
sible regulations, it suffices to show the types of tradeoffs involved.
I have divided considerations of the warranty rule into two catego-
ries, economic and moral, with the latter topic extending into polit-
ical theory.
institution for the treatment of dipsomania, and, having so entered it,
may lawfully be detained for a certain time notwithstanding any
attempted revocation of his consent .... From a moral point of view we
should say that a man in this condition is really divided against himself,
and that the law, taking notice of this abnormal fact, enables him to
strengthen his better against his worser self.
SIR FREDRICK POLLOCK, A First Book ofJurisprudence: Some General Legal Notions, in JURISPRU-
DENCE AND LEGAL ESSAYS 1, 36-37 (1961).
77. Elster referred to governmental institutions that can be seen as precommitment
devices. See ELSTER, ULYSSES, supra note 8, at 89-90. He included, depending on the
state, the central bank, foreign ministries, the BBC model of broadcasting, and periodic
elections. Schelling advanced the secret ballot as another example. See SCHELLING,
CONFLICT, supra note 6, at 19 ("[T]he mandatory secret ballot is a scheme to deny the
voter any means of proving which way he voted. Being stripped of his power to prove
how he voted, he is stripped of his power to be intimidated."). For more along these
lines, see infra note 193 and accompanying text.
78. The answer to the question may be foreshadowed by a rule of thumb: -[T]he less
equal are the parties to an agreement likely to be the more will the law tend to restrict
their freedom." Joseph Raz, On the Functions of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE
278, 293 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d series 1973). If the intervention is deemed
paternalistic, Shapiro argued that it should be up to the legislature, not the courts,
because of greater institutional competence and paternalism's problematic acceptability.
See Shapiro, supra note 7. That it is the legislature that intervenes makes it possible to
view some restrictions as self-paternalistic which would appear paternalistic by a court.
See id. at 564.
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A. The Economics of Intervention
The contemplated government intervention creates allocative and
distributive consequences. 79 I first examine allocative effects.
The mandatory warranty offering may lead to greater efficiency. 80
The clearest source of asymmetrical rationality is transaction costs,
primarily of obtaining and processing information. The warranty,
insofar as it is a product of competitive pricing, reflects in managea-
ble form the discounted costs of an important range of attributes
otherwise obtainable by the consumer only through experience or
research and reckoning (e.g., durability), 8' which is difficult to esti-
79. Assumed costless market and nonmarket approaches are, in theory, equally good
ways of solving market problems. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILLIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC
CHOICES 213 n.4 (1978). "In practice, then, the engaging question must be which in fact
costs more to establish in a particular situation and who bears the cost under each of the
two approaches." Id. See also Lewis A. Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of
Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591, 607-08 (1980) (recognizing that, though
induced level of care is same, there is distributive difference between strict products
liability system and system with negligence and contributory negligence). But Posner
insisted, for Coasean reasons, that "the choice among common law rules usually does
not have systematic distributive consequences." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF JUSTICE 102 (1981).
80. Intervention required because of market failure should mimic, according to
Posnerians, the result of an ideal market. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and
Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 542 (1980) ("They opt, in other words, for
the efficient outcome aspect of markets rather than their autonomous exchange
component."). My outlook, weighted towards the idea that legal and moral
responsibility follows from rationally chosen acts, emphasizes the autonomous exchange
component, not efficiency, although I believe that efficiency gains may occur as well. In
one of his articles, Schwartz doubted the efficiency of mandatory warranties, see Alan
Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1057-63
(1977), but this article excluded consideration of information failures, see id. at 1055,
which he recognized to be an important factor, see id. at 1083. In a later article, he and
Wilde took up the topic of information failures. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security
Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1461-62 (1983). They concluded that "if consumers
actually care about important contract terms, legislatures should facilitate comparison
shopping for them and courts should ban only those trivial terms that seem unfair." Id.
at 1462. Rizzo took a broader view and cautioned that efficiency arguments involve
extremely high information requirements going beyond the transacting parties
(spillover effects), and, being "well beyond the capacity of the courts or anyone else,"
raise the problem of second best. MarioJ. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 641, 642 (1980) (footnote omitted). For the theory of second best, see infra note
103. Shavell compared under differing circumstances the efficiency of regimes of
negligence versus strict liability (e.g., warranty), and concluded, depending on whether
the accident is between strangers, sellers and strangers, or sellers and customers, that
strict liability is sometimes more efficient, the problems being the customers'
misperceived risks and, especially, the parties' moral hazards. See Steven Shavell, Strict
Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
81. For the repeat player, say, the institutional buyer or the buyer of regularly
replaced goods, some of the information costs are amortized over many goods.
Experience and credence qualities will also be relatively cheaper to discern over the long
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mate at the time of purchase. Because of the warranty, the con-
sumer need not face being inundated by a flood of raw data, or
being left dry with minimal information. 2 The merchant's predi-
gestion of much input by the refined calculations needed to set a
price for the warranty helps narrow the gap towards Pareto
Optimality.83
Under the laws of supply and demand, the reduction of these con-
sumer transaction costs points towards increased volume for the
merchant. On the other hand, ex hypothesis, the consumer had
misperceived some of the underlying costs. If, once they are more
readily apparent, the costs are higher than expected by the con-
run. See Kuklin, supra note 2, at 938 n.155. (Goods have three types of qualities: search,
which are evident upon inspection before purchase, e.g., visual aesthetics; experience,
which require use after purchase, e.g., the taste of food; and credence, which need
special expertise even after purchase, e.g., whether the replaced auto part was actually
defective. Id.) The research effort may even be a positive, psychic benefit to the
consumer who, say, is a "techie" obtaining pleasure from poring over esoteric journals.
This last point adumbrates the way in which the concepts of an opportunity cost and
psychic benefit can be summoned as wild cards to ascribe rationality to a choice that
otherwise seems inefficient, or to write off these costs and benefits as unknowable,
thereby averting the demand to face up to the economic and moral consequences of
asymmetrical rationality. See generally Bailey Kuklin, The Gaps Between the Fingers of
the Invisible Hand (unpublished manuscript, on file with author, Brooklyn Law School).
82. From the strict liability under warranties, "because firms are liable for the actual
losses, consumers will be forced to take the actual risks into account through the prices
charged by firms." A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
100 (2d ed. 1989). The efficiency of strict liability is, consequently, independent of
consumer information. See id. Regarding the compulsory disclosure aspects of a
mandatory warranty offering, even when enforcement costs are included, "Not only may
the benefits of compulsory disclosure exceed those of voluntary disclosure, but it is at
least possible for the costs of compulsory disclosure to be less than the costs of
voluntary disclosure." William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in
Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 400, 432.
83. Meaning, it will lead to better resource allocation. See Kornhauser, supra note 79,
at 608. While "both parties to the contract benefit from the reduced transaction costs,"
id., for the consumer, the "improved choices [from more efficient purchasing decisions]
can lead to a large gain," H. Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information,
24 J.L. & EcON. 491, 502 (1981); but cf Bailey Kuklin, On the Knowing Inclusion of
Unenforceable Contract and Lease Terms, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 862-63 (1988) (arguing that
uninformed purchases may be fortuitously efficient).
In analyzing why some contractual arid tort duties are strict, Bishop, after noting the
information function of a price system and the seller's advantage in knowledge, urged
this as the predominate answer: the seller's "strict promise or unconditional warranty of
quality enables the buyer to use the seller's information even though the buyer does not
possess it himself. Contract duties are strict in order to transmit information or to make
information credible so that it may be used by others." William Bishop, The Contract-Tort
Boundary and the Economics of Insurance, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 241, 245 (1983). That
merchants are not ignorant of this, see, for example, the Renault advertisement of its
"protection plan" in Scientific American. ScI. AM., May 1985, at 78-79 ("We wouldn't
offer the industry's best small car protection unless we were sure our cars would live up
to it.").
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sumer, the sales will decrease in favor of relatively cheaper substi-
tute goods. Whether these two offsetting factors will lead to higher
or lower volume is an empirical matter.8 4
With a warranty offering, the goods and services probably im-
prove. The merchant (producer) will improve them to the point
where its cost for additional quality gains surpasses its benefit from
reduced warranty claims, and the rational consumer will willingly
pay for this.8 5 The merchant may have economies of scale, as, for
example, in making repairs under the warranty, 86 or in spreading
losses by obtaining insurance against mishaps.8 7 All else being
equal, the net result is a gain in social welfare because consumers as
a class will get more for their money.88
The offering of a warranty will alter the effects of moral hazard. 89
The merchant and the consumer who select the warranty impose
84. Many of my points require empirical work. "The one thing one can say with
great assurance is the following: no flat, a priori judgments about the price and quantity
effects of compulsory terms are possible - it all depends on the shapes of the [supply
and demand] curves and the structure of the market." Kennedy, supra note 4, at 607.
85. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw §§ 6.5-.6, 6.10-.11 (2d
ed. 1977). The value of the increased safety may be greater than the cost of the
improvements. See id. at 126. Because not all consumers will opt for the warranty, the
quality improvements will be less than for a mandatory warranty. See discussion of
distributive consequences infra note 106.
86. Because warranty work is labor intensive, Schwartz doubted there are significant
economies of scale. See Schwartz, supra note 80, at 1060. But in making his case, he
failed to note that the transaction costs of the consumer, primarily search (information)
costs in finding a suitable repairer, and the risks from the service credence qualities
(e.g., repairer's honesty) may be circumvented by the warranty. Schwartz made a second
point: "[E]ven if important economies of scale do exist, sellers are likely to have tapped
these opportunities without state intervention." Id. at 1061. This reliance upon the
invisible hand assumes the absence of information shortcomings and consumer
irrationalities, which I dispute, these factors being beyond the scope of his article. See id.
at 1055.
87. See POSNER, supra note 85, at 137, 141.
88. The information implicit in a warranty creates a positive effect another way: "If
buyers are unaware of product defects, then high quality sellers cannot command higher
prices than low quality sellers, and there may be a general deterioration in quality."
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
931, 939 (1985) (discussing "information asymmetry"). See also Schwartz, supra note 21,
at 9 (arguing that uninformed buyers will purchase too many high-risk goods). On the
other hand, disclosure requirements for certain product attributes may only shift
demand to those competitive producers of similar goods with a comparative advantage
with respect to the attributes. "[I]f consumers desire the attribute, then they benefit
from the disclosure as well. If there is a wealth transfer in this context, it is an intra-
industry transfer from one set of firms to another." Roberta Romano, A Comment on
Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions, and Their Implications for Public Policy, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 313, 321 (1986).
89. Moral hazard is the undesirable side effect whereby "the provision of insurance
[or other loss protection, e.g., a strict or nonliability rule] may increase the probability of
a loss or the size of the loss because the insured person has less of an incentive to take
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obvious moral hazards upon one another. Either party may take ad-
vantage, properly or improperly, of the risks contractually assumed
by the other. To clarify this, assume the merchant (producer) of a
television set warrants only the picture tube. As a result, the con-
sumer will then have less incentive to be careful with the tube (say,
the brightness control is turned up and the set kept on when no one
is viewing). Also, when nonwarranted defects occur the consumer
may be tempted to damage the picture tube in order to hide the
uncovered flaw, or the consumer might claim that the faulty picture
tube caused the other defect. 90 The merchant, on the other hand,
has comparable opportunistic gambits. When servicing or making
the set, it has less reason to be diligent about the nonwarranted
parts. Tube flaws may be attributed, falsely or questionably, to
other parts of the set or to abuse by the consumer. These moral
hazards undermine the goal of risk avoidance because the consumer
who can pass along accident or defect costs has less reason to take
precautions even though such precautions may be cheaper than the
merchant's, 9 ' and vice versa. Furthermore, unless they are liable,
neither party has an incentive to be careful about injuries to third
parties.92
The moral hazards may be diminished by some techniques. For
example, the clear elucidation of rights shrinks the fuzzy margin
around legitimate claims, making it more difficult to manufacture
questionable ones. 93 Additionally, sharing risks, as by splitting the
costs of warranty service, creates an incentive for both parties to be
careful. 94 But absolute rules do not solve the problem. While strict
caveat emptor at one pole, or an unlimited warranty at the other, make
precautions." POLINSKY, supra note 82, at 56. I use the term expansively to include the
opportunistic behavior that increases the losses from wrongful or problematic claims.
90. Because consumers vary in their carelessness or downright dishonesty, there will
be distributive consequences. The consumer who rarely makes claims effectively
subsidizes the common claimant by paying an "insurance premium" based upon the
average claim record. The subsidy may be reduced if the merchant can differentiate
among high and low risk consumer-claimants, which seems difficult.
91. See POSNER, supra note 85, § 6.11.
92. See id. at 125-26.
93. See also discussion of uncertainty costs infra note 98 and accompanying text.
94. For this to be effective, more information is required than is probably utilized.
In particular, since the consumer is likely to underestimate expected losses, see Kuklin,
supra note 2, at 972-79, 993, she will not take the proper precautions. See POLINSKv,
supra note 82, at 104-05 ("Thus, when consumers can affect expected accident losses by
taking care, but underestimate these losses, neither strict liability with a defense of
contributory negligence nor negligence may be ideal with respect to the care exercised
by the parties or with respect to the allocation of risk.").
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it hard to assert or resist claims,95 the rules maximize reciprocal
hazards. In other words, strict caveat emptor minimizes the
merchant's incentive for care, while an unlimited warranty mini-
mizes the consumer's incentive for care. The merchant is concerned
about goodwill losses despite a rule of caveat emptor, but these may
be slight, especially for rarely purchased consumer goods. 96
In addition to rule oriented moral hazards, there are other
sources of inefficiency. Some inefficiencies are transitional. For ex-
ample, the distillation of a warranty law through the dispute resolu-
tion processes creates administrative costs. 97 Insofar as the law is
indefinite, from static vagueness or during dynamic reformulation,
uncertainty costs follow from the reluctance of parties to take
risks. 98 Even when the law is fixed, administrative costs remain, 99
although law reform is relatively inexpensive when implemented not
by a regulatory apparatus, but by a change in legal rules only.' 00 By
mandating the warranty offering despite ostensible contract terms
to the contrary, the government desanctifies contracts, thereby cre-
95. Hard, but not impossible. A reciprocal moral hazard does not result from
divided risks only. For example, even under strict caveat emptor, the concern for
goodwill and the transaction costs of dealing with an aggressive, persistent consumer
may result in a type of moral hazard for the merchant. From the other side, even if the
merchant assumes all risks, this type of moral hazard remains for the consumer, as when
the merchant denies liability, saying "so sue me" in the belief that the consumer's
dispute costs will put an end to the matter. At this juncture, the usual countervailing
factors in dispute resolution come into play. For example, regarding opportunity costs,
if the consumer values her time more than does the merchant, the consumer may quickly
capitulate. Once the dispute advances beyond face-to-face complaint, the merchant may
have the economies of scale in resolving it, as by having a legal department.
96. Along with this last point, Kleinig posits that, despite the poor quality of goods,
the merchant's goodwill may be maintained by advertising, publicity strategies,
remoteness of harmful effects, and co-optation of media relying upon advertising
revenues. See KLEINIG, supra note 7, at 190. " 'Brand name' buying is some help, but
even that may be no safeguard against exploitation." Id.
97. Entirely private dispute resolution internalizes all the costs. Public resolution, as
through the courts, internalizes some of the costs, e.g., lawyer's fees.
98. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 85, at 424-25; Kuklin, supra note 83, at 884-85.
99. Polinsky and Posner examined the relative administrative costs under regimes of
negligence and strict liability, concluding that the cheaper system cannot be clearly
predicted. See POLINSKY, supra note 82, at 50-51; POSNER, supra note 85, § 21.5.
100. This law reform is cheap because "[n]o administrative apparatus is necessary to
police the new regime; the parties themselves will adjust to the absence of [the old rule],
as today they adjust to its presence." Alan Schwartz, Optimality and the Cutoff of Defenses
Against Financers of Consumer Sales, 15 INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 499, 504 n.7 (1974). Even if
not cheap, "[t]o the extent the benchmark for the measurement of costs is a perfectly
functioning market, observing high costs of regulation does not imply that regulation is
not wealth maximizing." Kornhauser, supra note 79, at 623 n.70. Or not justice
maximizing: "if an increase in litigation is the price we must pay for securing justice, we
might say (within limits) - so be it." Alan Wertheimer, The Equalization of Legal Resources,
17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 303, 321-22 (1988).
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ating a demoralization loss for those who lend importance to sancti-
fied contracts.' 0 ' On the other hand, there will be a psychic gain for
those who lend importance to desanctifying contracts deemed to be
unfair or inefficient. 10 2
Beyond the efficiency questions, there are distributive effects to
intervention.10 3 Once the warranty offering reveals costs that were
previously misperceived by the consumer, market changes occur
which impact on the merchant, consumer, and third parties. The
merchant loses the profit which had been made from inefficient
purchases.'0 4 The mandatory warranty offering shifts wealth from
101. Michelman coined "demoralization costs" while writing about compensable
takings:
'Demoralization costs' are defined as the total of (1) the dollar value
necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their
sympathizers specifically from the realization that no compensation is
offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future
production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused
by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and
other observers disturbed by the thought that they themselves may be
subjected to similar treatment on some other occasion.
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967) (footnote omitted).
102. My approach to the problem of asymmetrical rationality may be expressed
cynically this way:
As far as I can tell, any law may be justified as a rational response to a
market failure. If a constituency exists for a law, many people support it.
The rest is easy. An economist needs only to identify a 'moral'
externality, talk about 'free rider' problems, and then say that the benefits
of the legislation exceed the costs.
Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393, 1405 n.54
(1981). One hopes that Sagoff misspoke when he said "any law" can be so defended.
Be that as it may, as he recognized, this only shows that the human condition involves
difficult questions that cannot be solved by strict adherence to simplistic dogma, such as
blind faith in government intervention, or blind faith in the invisible hand.
103. The discussion of distributive effects encounters this cautionary observation:
[T]he general theory of second best applies as much to... distributional
issues as it does to the allocative-efficiency questions with which it has
traditionally been associated.... According to the general theory of the
second best, given any set of conditions whose fulfillment guarantees the
achievement of an optimum, if one or more of these conditions cannot be
fulfilled, there is no general reason to assume that a situation in which
more of the remaining conditions are fulfilled will be superior to one in
which fewer of the remaining conditions are fulfilled.
Richard S. Markovits, Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of Allocative Efficiency, 8 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 811, 884 & n.29 (1980).
104. The preferences of the parties and structure of the market may lead to
redistribution from the merchant to the consumer by other pathways as well. See
Kennedy, supra note 4, at 610-12, app. B(I). One would normally expect wealth to be
shifted from the merchant to the consumer, presumably then, from the richer to the
poorer. See id. On the other hand, the market may be such that wealth is shifted from
the consumer to the merchant, or both may be made worse off. See id. at 612.
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the merchant of goods with previously greater hidden costs to the
competitor with lesser ones. The merchant whose profitability de-
pended on the lost advantage is driven out of business. 10 5
Turning to the distributive effects on the consumer, as much as
her costs are lowered, her wealth increases. 10 6 The warranty offer-
ing shifts wealth from the consumer who had been less disadvan-
taged by the differential rationality (such as one from the more
sophisticated socioeconomic classes), or who does not prefer the
self-paternalistic warranty offering, to the consumer who had been
more disadvantaged, or who does prefer the new warranty term. 0 7
Turning finally to effects on third parties, those subject to negative
externalities from the purchased goods may also become better off,
as from safety measures. 0 8 The effects, both positive and negative,
105. See id. at 598. Furthermore, as noted for required disclosure, "Imposing the
costs of disclosure initially on the seller can also increase the cost of entry into that
market. Consequently, seller disclosure regulation can have some anticompetitive
effects which may offset the procompetitive effects resulting from an increase in
comparison shopping." Whitford, supra note 82, at 460 n. 187.
106. Overall wealth may increase because, owing to liability savings, the producer may
improve safety at a zero, long-term cost. See supra note 85; see also Kennedy, supra note 4,
at 610 ("[S]ellers [may] pass along no price increase at all because they are able to
modify their own or their employees' behavior, in response to the term, in a way that has
no impact on their costs."). Consumers may capture the producer's monopoly profits.
See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 7 (1981) ("By refusing to enforce the no-
warranty clause, we force automobile manufacturers to give up their monopoly profits to
consumers, and the result will be greater economic efficiency - manufacturers will be
moved to manufacture more or safer cars at the lower price.").
107. See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19J.L. & ECON. 211,
231-39 (1976) (discussing cross-subsidization tendency of price regulation). Kennedy
noticed that "to the extent that the term is unwanted, its cost will be distributed between
the parties, impoverishing sellers and buyers differentially according to the elasticities of
supply and demand curves and according to the competitive structure of the market."
Kennedy, supra note 4, at 609. For more complicated permutations, see id. at 611 n.19.
Conceivably, wealth may be shifted from the poorer consumers to the wealthier. See id.
at 612-13. Schwartz made this point on the grounds that the poor are more risk averse
and have less to lose upon default than the rich, and thus the mandatory term "will bear
more harshly upon the poor than upon the affluent." See Schwartz, supra note 80, at
1058-59. On the economic effects of risk attitudes, see generally Kuklin, supra note 2, at
974. Regarding disclosure regulation, Whitford noted that, insofar as sophistication in
using information coincides with wealth, the benefits may favor the wealthier, and if
consumers bear the costs of disclosure, this constitutes "a form of regressive taxation."
Whitford, supra note 82, at 460 (footnote omitted). When one throws in transaction
costs related to the loss, including perhaps the higher opportunity costs of the wealthier,
the bottom line is beyond calculation. See infra note 110. Finally, there is another factor
when the merchant offers various options, particularly warranty coverage. If the
consumer has and accurately processes information about her own costs that is unknown
to the merchant, the strategic behavior of the consumer and the merchant will lead to
inefficiencies possibly having distributive consequences. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at
26-28.
108. See KLEINIG, supra note 7, at 188-89 (discussing "argument from externalities"
that supports minimum quality and safety standards); Kennedy, supra note 4, at 609
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of the mandatory warranty ripple out to dependents (e.g., spouses
and children) and supporters (e.g., parents and friends), to workers
in directly impacted industries (and their dependents and support-
ers), to those involved with markets that feel the result of reallocat-
ing resources, and lastly to those who contribute to social insurance
funds (e.g., taxpayers).10 9 However, even if these allocative and dis-
tributive effects can be calculated, which may be doubted," I 0 moral
and political questions cannot be answered by a cost-benefit analysis
alone.' 
B. The Morality of Self-Paternalistic Intervention
Several viewpoints should be given voice in the debate over the
normative appropriateness of intervention, in this instance, the
mandatory warranty offering." 2 The self-paternalistic consumer
(arguing that mandatory safety measures "reduce the risk of injury to bystanders as well
as to buyers"). Schwartz considered other third-party effects by assuming "that X, a
wealthy individual, derives satisfaction (or, as economists say, 'utility') from the
knowledge that poor people make 'wise' purchases." Schwartz, supra note 80, at 1061.
He discounted this effect because of the indefiniteness of the required calculations that
must include "the effect on the utilities of those Y's (negative) who derive satisfaction
from knowing that the poor are free to contract." Id. at 1062. I would ignore both
effects because they derive from the pleasures of paternalists, both X and Y, this element
properly being irrelevant. These "other-regarding" repercussions are socially
noncognizable under Mill's "harm principle". See Bailey Kuklin, Punishment: The Civil
Perspective of Punitive Damages, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 35-38 (1989).
109. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 609.
110. Especially in light of the additional complications mentioned in the footnotes
above, once again, the net effect, as Kennedy put it, is indeterminate. See id. at 609-14.
Apparently to deprecate the motives of the liberal, Kennedy opined "that it will often
make sense for a decision maker to make rough intuitive assessments of all these factors
and then go ahead and act on distributive grounds," on efficiency grounds, and "on the
ground that the only people he is likely to hurt are sellers." Id. at 614. Finally, to throw
salt at the wounds of the bleeding-heart liberal, "When we add the factor of paternalism,
... there may be a strong case for intervention even with sketchy information and a lot
of uncertainty about just how the effects will play themselves out." Id.
111. Wealth is not the only thing on the bottom line. "Economic methods cannot
supply the information necessary to justify public policy. Economics can measure the
intensity with which we hold our beliefs; it cannot evaluate those beliefs on their merits.
Yet such evaluation is essential to political decision making." Sagoff, supra note 102, at
1410. Along with the problems from the theory of second best, see supra note 103, and
for similar reasons, economic theorists "must exclude from the calculus of pure
efficiency all possibility of private preferences for principles of right or social justice as
such." Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 1015, 1035 (1978). On bases such as this, Kennedy leveled an attack on liberal
law and economics scholars, such as Ackerman, Calabresi, and Michelman, who generate
systems of private law rules by means of the efficiency criterion. See Duncan Kennedy,
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
112. Although the discussion of the normative considerations centers on the claims
stemming from the self-paternalistic justification for government intervention, the
market itself raises moral and political issues. For example, since:
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and the merchant obviously have something to say. Those with
moral or political claims also include consumers who prefer no self-
paternalistic constraints, and, more broadly, personally disinter-
ested onlookers from society who base their points on general prin-
ciple. To facilitate the expression of these views, I engage them in a
script drafted along the lines of Ackerman's neutral conversation." 3
Under this procedure, citizens in a liberal democracy debate their
claims to resources and powers as equals, from positions of un-
dominated equality.'1 4 When reasoning ends at basic values, and a
debater resorts to the assertion of the superiority of her values or
herself, the gist of the irrebutable countermove, the conversational
constraint that reduces the asserter to silence, is: "Why? Am I not
just as good as you are?" '"15
The cast of characters in the neutral dialogue is the self-paternal-
istic consumer (Consenter), the merchant and other business inter-
ests (Merchant)," 16 the interested consumer not consenting to the
real markets are not perfectly competitive .... their many imperfections
are morally significant .... The many consequent benefits and costs [of
competitive markets] are joint social products, not the sole responsibility
of the individuals upon whom they fall. How this social surplus is to be
distributed is an unavoidable problem for a theory of social justice....
[and not] beyond moral assessment.
Daniel H. Hausman, Are Markets Morally Free Zones?, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 318
(1989).
113. Ackerman outlined the theory:
The germ of the idea is that nobody has the right to vindicate political
authority by asserting a privileged insight into the moral universe which
is denied the rest of us. A power structure is illegitimate if it can be
justified only through a conversation in which some person (or group)
must assert that he is (or they are) the privileged moral authority:
Neutrality. No reason is a good reason if it requires the power holder to
assert: (a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by
any of his fellow citizens, or (b) that, regardless of his conception of the
good, he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his fellow citizens.
ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 10-11 (emphasis omitted). Nozick essentially agreed:
When someone raises a moral objection to something we are doing or
planning, we feel we owe him an answer, a moral answer.... [Tihe only
way to respond to his requesting moral reasons or raising moral objec-
tions, the only response to it qua that, is to offer moral reasons injustifi-
cation or defense of our actions, to engage, if need be, in a moral
dialogue with him.
ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 469 (1981). See also SAMUEL STOLJAR, AN
ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS 77-79 (1984) (stating that claim to right calls for response).
114. See ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 17-19 (stating that while neutral dialogue begins
from position of mutual equality, subsequent conversations allocate power and
resources in unequal manner).
115. See id. at 8-10 (arguing in "constrained power talk" that one can delegitimate
power structure by reducing its proponent to silence).
116. To represent all the business interests, perhaps more than just Merchant should
be given a role because market competitors can level complaints against one another.
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self-paternalistic move (Nonconsenter), and society at large
(Onlooker). "17
CONSENTER: Whether or not I actually make direct use of the
option created by the mandatory warranty offering, this self-pater-
nalistic intervention enlarges my autonomy and liberty. While
before I was far from the position to make a fully responsible
purchasing decision, now I am in a better position, better absolutely
and better relative to Merchant because the differential rationality
between us is less. From a deontological standpoint," I8 the inter-
vention reinforces my autonomy without unfairly invading the
Merchant's autonomy. 119 Out of earshot of the Sirens of the mar-
ketplace, from a fairly Archimedean point for appraisal, I prefer and
consent to this self-paternalism. It materially enhances my rights.
From a utilitarian or teleological standpoint, economic efficiency be-
ing justifiable in these terms, my self-paternalistic step, insofar as it
promotes efficiency, brings about an increase in the good. To the
extent the invisible hand operates in the political marketplace, the
intervention increases also the social welfare as evidenced by the
majority of us citizens who, through our representatives, advance
our welfare by enacting this legislation.' 20 Because the logic of col-
Ackerman, positing that the legitimacy of the "competitive power relations" in the ideal
market of neoclassical economists "is hardly self-evident," stated that "The dialogic
burden becomes far heavier" once one faces the imperfections outside the ideal market.
Bruce A. Ackerman, On Getting What We Don't Deserve, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Autumn 1983,
at 60, 65. In light of the "whole series of market imperfections, informational
disadvantages, [and] transactional rigidities .... How, then, are those favored by real-
world markets to answer for their superior transactional position when called to account
by their disadvantaged competitors?" Id. at 65-66.
117. Because of the pervasiveness of consumerism, the percentage of disinterested
onlookers may, unfortunately, be small. This frustrates the assumption of democracy
that "a substantial majority of concerned but disinterested citizens . . . will prevent
policies from being shaped by those with direct economic self-interests .... They are to
arbitrate and judge the disputes of the interested parties." LESTER C. THUROW, THE
ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 16 (1980).
118. The basic moral theory discussed in the dialogue is elaborated in Kuklin, supra
note 83, at 847-61.
119. In James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1617-25 (1981), the
author argued that the legal refusal to enforce an unjustly enriching contract is not a
denial of the enricher's autonomy. The defensible principle is that the government
ought not to second-guess, by interfering with, the enricher's values as indicated by his
choice of goods. But when the same goods can be obtained elsewhere at a lower price,
this shows a lack of information or utilization of the market by the enricher. The
government may then interfere without invading his autonomy since his conception of
the good is not doubted, only his inefficient means of realizing it. Nor may the enriched
party complain about invasions of his own autonomy: "The law . . . has no reason to
value this exercise of autonomy" manifested by a person "enriching himself by taking
advantage of the necessity or ignorance of another." Id. at 1619.
120. The warrant for invoking government intervention must not be summarily
dismissed by language reminiscent of arguments against paternalism, such as Thurow's.
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lection action cuts against us, our organized efforts to achieve this
intervention reveal further the depth of our preference and
commitment.
You, Merchant, have no greater moral complaint against my self-
paternalistic invocation of government assistance than you would
against my private attempts, unfortunately ineffective, to right the
imbalance in our decisionmaking positions. Your private moral
claims in both instances are groundless. You cannot maintain that
you ought to have a right or entitlement per se to take advantage of
the inherent and imposed differential rationality.121 That there is an
inherent differential is morally neutral. I have at least as much
moral right to resist my inherent disadvantage as you do to take ad-
vantage of it. 122 Am I not just as good as you are? The fact that
there is an imposed differential is not morally neutral, especially be-
Owing to advertising, for most Americans, "Physiological needs determine very few of
our expenditure decisions. Individual consumers may be making silly decisions (buying
products at prices higher than they need to pay), but it is hardly the appropriate role of
government ... to stop people from making silly decisions that do not affect anyone but
themselves." THUROW, supra note 117, at 147. First, the silly decision also affects those
who are dependent on the consumer. Second, it affects and is affected by the merchant
and, though the merchant will not complain, this raises moral questions about the
fairness of the status quo. Third, it influences the availability and price of competitive
and substitute goods, thereby affecting third parties, including other consumers and
merchants. Fourth, the consumer is not saying to the government, "Stay out of this";
instead she is saying, "Help me stop making silly decisions." Elsewhere Thurow
recognizes that consumer legislation is not "forced upon society by some extremely
powerful minority that wants to torment the current economic system." Id. at 20.
Instead, enactment occurs because "most of us want to be protected from our own
mistakes." Id. Even if the silly decision bears only on the wealth of the consumer,
because "income and wealth are [not then] distributed in accordance with equity
(whatever that may be), individual preferences are [not] properly weighted, and the
market can[not] efficiently adjust to an equitable set of demands." Id. at 194.
121. Much has been made of the asymmetries in a transaction between an individual
and a corporation. See, e.g.,JAMES S. COLEMAN, THE ASYMMETRIC SOCIETY 21-22 (1982)
(arguing that corporate actors control much of relevant information). "[T]he corporate
actor nearly always controls most of the conditions surrounding the relation .... The
end result is that two parties beginning with nominally equal rights in a relation, but
coming to it with vastly different resources, end with very different actual rights in the
relation." Id. Coleman called for the "recognition by the law of the power disparities"
by "an explicit unbalancing of rights, in order to balance the realization of interest among
unequal parties, or else somewhat more direct intervention of the law into the exercise
of rights." JAMES S. COLEMAN, POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY 77 (1974). See also
L.T. HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM 47 (1911); JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 104-05 (1982) (discussing mortgages of farmland); Barbara A. Curran,
Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer-Credit Problems, 8 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
409, 435-36 (1967).
122. "There is no Principle of Moral Inertia: there is no prima facie duty to refrain
from interfering with existing states of affairs just because they are existing states of
affairs." JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS,
RESTITUTION, AND RISK 78, 84 (William Parent ed., 1986).
CINCINNATI LA W REVIEW
cause you are the imposer who then exploits it.123 Arguably, you
even have a moral obligation not to exploit your inherent advantage
over me.' 24 You use me as a means only to your own ends.' 25
MERCHANT: You speak too glibly, Consenter. I understand the
thrust of your deontological point that I have no rightful claim to
123. Exploitation, according to Feinberg, is usually "harmful to the interests of the
exploitee. Very commonly it coerces or deceives him, or takes advantage of his personal
incompetence, in which cases it is not voluntarily consented to, and therefore, when
harmful, is a wrong to the person it exploits." FEINBERG, supra note 16, at 176. For an
analysis of exploitation, see id. at ch. 31, and for a discussion of the exploitation
principle, see id. at ch. 32.
Put very vaguely, all interpersonal exploitation involves one party (A)
profiting from his relation to another party (B), by somehow "taking
advantage" of some characteristic of B's, or some feature of B's
circumstances. When the exploitation is coercive, the characteristic of B
that is taken advantage of is his lack of power relative to A, as when A, for
example, is in a superior bargaining position .... The essential point is
that because of something about B, which A uses in a certain way, A
profits.
Id. at 178-179. This is usually "unfair", id., but even when not unfair because of B's
voluntary consent, it may still be wrong. Id. at 181. Regardless of consent, "insofar as
A's profitable utilization of B is the consequence of manipulation, it also tends to be
unfair to B." Id. at 201. The overall degree of unfairness "[depends] on how the other
party was used ... , on which traits or circumstances were utilized ... , [and] on how
gains and losses [between A and B] were distributed." Id. at 204 (Diagram 31-1).
124. Aristotle's commutative justice fosters a strong view of advantage-taking: "To
paraphrase Aristotle only slightly, commutative justice operates on the principle that no
one should gain by another's loss." Gordley, supra note 119, at 1589 (referring to
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics V, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Richard McKeon
ed., 1941)). When the victim's interest is adversely affected through exploitation,
Feinberg's "exploitation principle", under which wrongful gain may be legally
prevented, is inapplicable only when there was "fully voluntary consent". See FEINBERG,
supra note 16, at 211-12. As is evident from the discussion, my position is that the
consumer's consent can hardly be calledfully voluntary. For a libertarian argument for
advantage-taking, see Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE
L.J. 472 (1980); but see Larry Alexander & William Wang, Natural Advantages and
Contractual Justice, 3 LAw & PHIL. 281, 282-284 (1984) (critizing Kronman's libertarian
argument on its own terms); see also infra note 161 (presenting additional criticism of
Kronman's analysis).
To defend the contention that differential rationality, especially when knowingly
exacerbated and exploited by one of the transacting parties, creates a moral obligation,
one may build on Fletcher's principle regarding the
rationale of liability that cuts across negligence, intentional torts, and
numerous pockets of strict liability .... [A] victim has a right to recover
for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and different in order from
those created by the victim and imposed on the defendant - in short, for
injuries resulting from nonreciprocal risks.
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1972).
125. Feinberg asserted that "exploitation of a person is normally a way of using
someone for one's own ends, which is somehow wrongful or blameworthy, whether it
wrongs the other person or not." FEINBERG, supra note 16, at 177; see Kuklin, supra note
2, at 1007 n.3 7 1 (mustering views of Feinberg, Kronman, Raz, Sunstein and others on
exploitation and related notions).
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impose purposive distortions on your actions simply because they
are advantageous to me. If, however, the good, be it efficiency or
whatever, is increased by such an imposition, then a utilitarian case
is made out for it. Whether the warranty offering improves effi-
ciency is a complicated empirical question that mere speculation
cannot answer. This question must be left to detailed investigation.
Furthermore, you gloss over too quickly your right to resist inherent
disadvantages that are not caused by me. I am not at fault for them,
why should I be constrained because of them? I, like everyone else,
have a just claim to the gains from life's lottery.126 Am I not just as
good as you are?
CONSENTER: Yes, Merchant, while you reap systematic gains
because there are costs perceivable to you that are misperceived by
me, I concede that the existence of this inherent condition is not
your fault. On the other hand, your consequent gains cannot be
said to result either from my faulti27 or your desert, in that you have
126. [T]he question that most seriously divides liberals and separates the
welfare-statists from the libertarians ... [is] the question of whether one
is morally entitled to the fruits of one's good fortune in life's natural
lottery of endowments and opportunities in the face of claims of superior
need due to misfortune ....
Larry Alexander, Liberalism as Neutral Dialogue: Man and Manna in the Liberal State, 28
UCLA L. REV. 816, 816-17 (1981). The most famous argument from the libertarian
wing is Nozick's "Wilt Chamberlain" hypothetical in which injustice cannot be asserted
if Wilt is allowed to keep the proceeds from those who choose to pay to see him per-
form. See NoziCK, supra note 56, at 160-64 (illustrating that patterned end-state princi-
ples may be thwarted by people voluntarily transferring some of shares they receive
under principle). Rawls, a liberal, insisted that one deserves neither one's native endow-
ments, initial starting place in society, nor even one's superior character. See RAWLS,
supra note 4, at 104; but see GEORGE SHER, DESERT 22-36 (1987) (criticising Rawls' analy-
sis). Rawls kept the original social contractors behind a veil of ignorance regarding their
natural endowments as a means to prevent them from exploiting their endowments to
the disadvantage of the less gifted. See RAWLS, supra, § 24. Likewise, Ackerman disal-
lowed the power holder from claiming in a neutral dialogue that "he is intrinsically su-
perior." See ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 10-11 (quoted supra note 113).
127. Bennett began his defense of this proposition by stating that the choice to study
esoteric subjects, "rather than the details of the automobile or refrigerator markets,"
does not make one "at fault in any way. Even if I were to devote all my time to
rationalizing my consumption, it is not clear that I could succeed." John G. Bennett,
Ethics and Markets, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 195, 203 (1985). It is hard enough "to deal
rationally with the major outlines of one's life," such as marriage, divorce, childbearing,
and career choice; "We can't expect the details of consumption to be handled ideally."
Id.
Even if the consumer fails to protect herself as much as is reasonable or efficient, and
thus in some sense might be blameworthy, it doesn't follow that the law should not
protect her. The benefits of the law are not simply rewards for good behavior. Some
are designed to protect "those who will not look out for themselves .... " Gregory
Vlastos, Human WIorth, Merit, and Equality, in MORAL CONCEPrs 141, 145 n.1 (Joel
Feinberg ed., 1969); see also Kuklin, supra note 83, at 858 n.35 (noting that law of fraud
exists to protect the foolish).
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not earned the windfall advantage. Thus, there is moral neutral-
ity. 1 2 8 Our dealings do not meet the standard economic model of
two transactors, each truly knowing her own valuation of the goods,
increasing their individual utilities by bargaining at arm's length
over a sale price somewhere between the two valuations. When I
enter the marketplace aware of your advantage, I still am not able to
bargain reasonably with you over surrendering it. Admittedly there
is a regressive quality to this point, but, in the end, you must agree
that the very asymmetry in question prevents rational utility max-
imization by me through bargaining because I am unable to know
sufficiently well beforehand the range of the actual value to me of
the disadvantage. 29
To make my moral case another way, suppose I could hoist myself
to an even footing with you entirely without help from others. As-
sume, for example, that technological advances allow me to walk
into your establishment with a small computer that generates accu-
rate costing data for each of your goods. You could not complain of
unfairness. Even if this computer (with voice synthesizer) nagged
me out of succumbing to my weakness of will, overdiscounting long
term benefits in favor of instant gratification, and so forth, you still
would be held to silence. When one adds to the circumstances the
128. Not only does neither party have a fault or desert claim against the other in this
case, but also they have no claim against society in general, according to Baker. See C.
Edwin Baker, Counting Preferences in Collective Choice Situations, 25 UCLA L. REV. 381, 397-
98 (1978) ("[O]ne normally has no right to demand that the human world have a
particular content .... ). Beyond a right to equal treatment, no person can claim that
society owes her resource allocation rules personally more advantageous. Id.
129. Fried discussed the problem of bargaining and moral foundations, mainly in the
context of fraud. See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 100-04 (1978).
Fraud might be viewed as simply a lack of equality in respect to an initial
endowment of information .... My objection is that the central validating
process of bargaining in EAR [economic analysis of rights] must assume
some background entitlements which guarantee the integrity of the
bargainers as intelligent, free agents. Without this background,
exchanges between individuals cannot be described as bargains or
exchanges at all.
Id. at 100. Fried was uneasy and suspicious about the notion that one, aware of one's
ignorance, can bargain for the information. Id. at 101. The assumption that one is the
best judge of one's own welfare "makes the possession of knowledge and the capacity to
reflect upon it not the subjects of bargaining but the foundations for bargaining." Id.
Without the foundations, "the result of a process of bargaining can no longer be seen as
validating anything [here, validating the results of the bargaining as efficient]." Id. at
102. "What we have, in short, are pretheoretic goods, or rights, assumed to be necessary
if the theory is to work at all." Id. The calculations based upon the lessons from the
studies of choice under risk and uncertainty may help the consumer somewhat as a prac-
tical matter, see Kuklin, supra note 2, at 973-79, but they strike me as not resolving the
moral issue of whether the consumer ought to be relegated to such a probabilistic expe-
dient when the merchant need not, or at least, need not as much.
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fact that you often lead me into temptation with various ruses, to say
nothing of the puffing and avoidance tactics which verge into non-
disclosure and misrepresentation, you must remain silenter still. 130
NONCONSENTER: You, Consenter, may well have the moral
right with respect to Merchant to resist its advantage, but the form
of your resistance impacts on me. Because I neither cause your dis-
advantage nor receive any benefit from .it, what moral right with re-
spect to me do you have to counter it in a manner that disfavors me?
You object to invasions of your autonomy, but by this legislation
you are invading mine. 13 1 My preferred package of goods does not
include the increased quality and other supposed gains that flow
from proffered warranties.13 2 I like the availability of nonwarrantied
130. In discussing very unequal contracts, Hobhouse pitted the "sufferer ...beset
with a fiend within" against the cool "tempter", and found "a form of coercion here
which the genuine spirit of liberty will not fail to recognize as its enemy, and a form of
injury to another which is not the less real because its weapon is an impulse which forces
that other to the consent which he yields." HOBHOUSE, supra note 121, at 81. Even if we
decline to treat the marketplace as coercive, as noted before, it is still difficult to claim
that the consumer has fully consented to the contract. Seegenerally O'Neill, supra note 23.
Machina stated a point related to Hobhouse's with charged words: "Cynical
manipulation of information and attitude-forming materials in an attempt to deceive
potential buyers into parting with their money is a thinly disguised form of stealing
practiced by some advertisers." Kenton F. Machina, Freedom of Expression in Commerce, 3
LAw & PHIL. 375, 392 (1984). Even when the deception fails, the "attempted theft"
remains. Id. "Commercial expression has tremendous potential for abuse in this way,
and such abuse runs directly counter to the rights of potential buyers on almost
anyone's view of those rights." Id.; see also KLEINIG, supra note 7, at 188 (owing to
difficulty of determining fraud, there is nonpaternalistic argument from fraud protection
that supports minimum quality and safety standards).
131. This response will engender debate: "Coercion is justified when it is part of a
general scheme for expanding the range and power of the will of each person. One may
control the will of another only if that is justified somewhow by an expansion in will."
Hugh Gibbons,Justifying Law: An Explanation of the Deep Structure of American Law, 3 LAw &
PHIL. 165, 170 (1984).
132. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 598. Kennedy noted four groups of buyers that are
affected:
(1) there are those whose risk preferences and valuations have been
overruled, who end up paying for precautions they don't want; (2) there
are, possibly, buyers who wouldn't pay the full costs of the precautions
but are delighted to get them at a reduced price because of incomplete
pass-along; (3) there are those who have the same risk preferences as the
state but figured that they could avoid accident losses more cheaply
through their own precautions than through the seller's; and (4) there are
those who are priced out of the market and purchase their next most
favored good rather than this one.
Id. at 652-53. Elsewhere, Kennedy raised the "inherently political questions" of
whether society is fair to those in groups (1), (3) and (4). See Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1759 (1976). Moreover,
"supposing that we can eliminate disclaimers without causing a fully compensating price
hike, is it either ethically or economically desirable thus to shift the balance of economic
power toward the consumer at the expense of the manufacturer?" Id. For more along
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goods. One, they usually have a cheaper price tag and I prefer to
have money in my pocket up front. 3 3 Two, I am more careful than
most people and don't need the additional protection. 3 4 Three, I
enjoy searching for information about the quality of goods, but the
warranty offering will decrease the payoff and therefore my plea-
sure. 13 5 Four, I can take precautions against defects more cheaply
than can Merchant.' 3 6 Five, I am a do-it-yourselfer who relishes
making repairs myself. Six, even when I don't fix them myself I can
get cheap repairs elsewhere (e.g., from my brother-in-law, the
handyman). Seven, I already have an inexpensive insurance policy
that covers the risks.' 3 7 Eight, insurance or not, I am a risk prefer-
rer who likes the thrill of assuming risks.' 3 8
The net result of the differences in consumers' costs and prefer-
ences is that the goods cost some of us more than others, or the
goods provide less satisfaction. While your proposed intervention
may narrow this range, it forces me to pay more than before, per-
haps effectively more than you will end up paying because fewer of
my preferences will be met. I may even be priced out of the market
altogether. 3 9 It is not fair to me that I must pay more or achieve
the lines of this last question, see Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
HARV. L. REV. 561, 625-33 (1983).
133. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 30 n.41.
134. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 651.
135. Information collection and processing raise transaction costs. By reducing
information costs through the proffered warranty, the consumers for whom these costs
are low (or negative) will lose at least some of their relative advantage (or opportunity),
thereby redistributing wealth from these consumers to those with high transaction costs.
See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 31-32. Moralisms also abound, for example: "For your
laziness in not investigating the safety of those goods, you deserve the injury." See id. at
32.
136. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 651 (stating that to cope with risk, consumer "might
plan to modify the product himself for less .... ).
137. See id. at 651; Schwartz, supra note 21, at 30 n.41.
138. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1168-69. On the reasonability and voluntariness of
assuming risks, see generally FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, ch. 20; Eric Von
Magus, Preference, Rationality, and Risk Taking, 94 ETHICS 637 (1984). The difficulty in
discerning the basis of the risk preference is reason for caution, "But if it is clear that
irrational discounting is occurring, and if the short-term costs of intervention are small,
government action is justified." Sunstein, supra, at 1169.
Speaking of risk preference, Calabresi did not forget the thrill-seeking producer: "If
we have caveat emptor, consumer liability, then the poor producer who wishes to take a
risk of a product which causes injury, because he likes to take risks, is deprived of that
opportunity." Transcript, supra note 5, at 121 (comment of Guido Calabresi).
139. Partially rebutting this argument, Kleinig contended that the weak bargaining
power of the poor must be taken into account: "Their preparedness to shoulder the
risks associated with an inferior product may signify not a 'best buy' so much as an 'only
buy.' Is it fair that the only option available is a fairly unreliable or unsafe product?"
KLEINIG, supra note 7, at 190. Low interest loans or subsidies may be the proper societal
response to higher price tags. Id.
SELF-PATERNALISM
less satisfaction so that you can get more of what you want.140 My
preferences and position of cost advantage are fair, reasonable, and
sensible. Why should I lose out simply because I am in the minor-
ity? Am I not just as good as you are?
CONSENTER: I admit, Nonconsenter, that, all else equal, I have
no greater moral claim to my preferred package of goods than you
do to yours. But the tragic fact is that we both cannot have our
preferences fully satisfied. 41 The economies are to the contrary. I
have done nothing to lose my claim, and you have done nothing to
earn yours. The fact that the availability of your preferred mix of
goods is a secondary effect of the imperfections in the marketplace
gives you no moral claim to it. As between you and me, your benefit
from the status quo is a matter of chance. This benefit is a morally
neutral contingency. If all of us consumers are ignorant about ex-
actly what we will get when we purchase goods - we all shoot in the
dark in estimating costs and benefits - you, as a winner of this lot-
tery, would be hard pressed to assert that you deserve to win more
than me, one of the unlucky. One does not have a moral claim to
the payoff from a gamble (i.e., regarding the availability and, per-
haps, subsidization of one's preferred goods) against one who
neither chooses to gamble142 nor consensually accepts benefits from
the game.' 43 If your fortunate edge in gaining what you prefer is
due to nature, that is, you are endowed with superior talents or I am
140. Kleinig turned this argument against Nonconsenter. While some persons may
truly prefer the excluded goods and services, "it is arguable that they would most often
be purchased as a result of ignorance, mistake, or weakness of bargaining power. It
might also be suggested that it is only because the producers/sellers can rely on such
sales that the goods and services in question remain economically viable." Id. at 189.
141. The word "tragic" evokes the more distressing lessons of the renowned work,
GUIDo CALABRESI & PHILLIP BoBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). While far short of a
matter of triage, the lawmaker, depending on the market, may have to overrule some
consumers' preferences, for example, either the preference for lower prices despite
harsher terms, or the preference for nonharsh terms despite higher prices. Then may
come this conclusion: "Put another way, regulation prevents consumers from making
informed decisions between contract terms and prices." Schwartz & Wilde, supra note
59, at 667. I would not put it this other way, since I insist that without regulation
consumers make only partially informed decisions, and even with the proposed
regulation they remain far from fully informed.
142. It is morally untenable for one to consent to a gamble, that is, the rules of a
game, and thereafter attempt to regain sustained losses. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO
OTHERS 35-36, 115-16 (1984). But the issue here is over which rules are actually, or
should be, consented to.
143. Under the circumstances one should not apply the "principle of fairness" of
H.L.A. Hart and Rawls whereby moral claims can be made against one who accepts
benefits from an overall "just, mutually advantageous, cooperative venture," e.g., the
market. See NOZICK, supra note 56, at 90-95 (rejecting principle of fairness in all
circumstances). In this day and age, how can one rationally decide to decline the
benefits of the market, most certainly for necessaries, but also for luxury goods,
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endowed with inferior ones, most ethicists would reject the claim
that you deserve the fruits of your natural traits or I deserve the
spoilage of mine. 144 You may be allowed to keep your fruits be-
cause it is to the overall benefit of society, but you do not deserve
them since you have not earned them. Finally, if the original differ-
ence between us is due to nurture, for example, because you have
been trained to be more diligent about, or obtain pleasure from,
informational research, or because you have been disciplined
against succumbing to temptations and other decision-biasing influ-
ences, still your complaint would ring hollow against me as someone
who is rationally endeavoring to overcome my poorer nurturing.
You have no moral claim to the benefits of having had virtuous
caregivers.145
I may grant, however, that you do deserve the advantages of char-
acter traits which are a product of your own efforts. 146 In so much
as you are a self-made person who has refined the clay of nature and
nurture through the sweat of your brow, consequently overcoming
hurdles faced in the marketplace, or in so much as you have re-
formed your preferences to conform to the available goods, you in-
deed may have earned the payoff. But if I grant this, it also applies
to me. One of the main reasons I am seeking government interven-
tion is to overcome the result of my own weaknesses. I admit there
are other ways to do some of this without impacting on you. For
example, I could undergo psychotherapy to become disenamored of
attractive spokespersons or to become risk preferring. Not all plau-
sible steps are as silly as this, nevertheless, most approaches are
inefficient or character-altering with possibly negative spillovers
(e.g., I do not want to be the kind of person who can stand the
drudgery of poring over technical literature), and none will rectify
all my disadvantages, some of which have nothing to do with effi-
ciency or character traits. Though I think it probable that the availa-
bility of your preferred goods in the existing marketplace does not
especially when the benefits of the luxuries are unclear to the consumer and the
merchants have worsened the murkiness?
144. See supra note 126 (discussing whether one is morally entitled to one's
endowments and initial position in society).
145. Do the caregivers have a claim on behalf of the advantaged consumer? If their
virtue of superior caregiving is a product of chance, nature, or nurture, then no.
Without examining the regressive aspect of this point, one might ask: Is there no place
for desert? Finessing the labyrinths of freewill and determinism, compatibilism, and
incompatibilism, see generally DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF MODERN
SCIENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SYMPOSIUM (Sidney Hook ed., 1958); MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
(John M. Fischer ed., 1986), I find some place for desert in the next point.
146. See, e.g., SHER, supra note 126, at 23. Rawls denied this is-possible. See id. at 23-
25.
696 [Vol. 60
SELF-PA TERNALISM
result from prior efforts by you to become self-made, it is conceiva-
ble that it does. In any event, perhaps I am self-making myself, to
some extent, by my efforts at trying to obtain government assistance
in mandating the warranty offering (assuming my caregivers did not
instill this in me). Must we debate whether my efforts at becoming
self-made are greater than yours, however this is measured? 47
In particular instances, the self-paternalistic intervention might
facilitate your preferred purchases and frustrate mine. Logs may
roll between us. 148 Regardless, you could not rightfully object if I
solved the economic and other problems of private self-paternalism.
If I did solve them, the economies may result in merchants offering
my preferred mix of goods and not yours. I am not paternalizing
you. I recognize the validity of your preferences and the importance
of allowing you to pursue them. But the same validity and impor-
tance obtains for me. In this regard, we are in a zero-sum game: you
get what you want or I get what I want. 149 Though my proposed
147. With respect to claimed rights, Sher wrote that this debate is superfluous
because effort alone does not give rise to rights: "To say that a hard worker deserves
something is not to say that anyone is obligated to provide him with it, to refrain from
interfering with his efforts to obtain it, or to prevent anyone else from interfering with
those efforts. In itself, diligent effort creates no entitlements." Id. at 54 (footnote
omitted).
148. Tullock discussed rule changes "that will make everyone better off ex ante," that
is, prospects are generally improved even though some persons will actually end up
worse off. Gordon Tullock, Two Kinds of Legal Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 659, 663
(1980). "Still, ex ante everybody benefits and rational persons would choose the
improved law simply because it gives them a better gamble, even though as a matter of
fact they may lose that gamble." Id. What of the merchant? It may not be better off ex
ante. "Lastly, however, and this is the most difficult problem, there may be changes in
the law that benefit some yet directly injure others. The first thing to be said about such
changes is that every effort should be made to minimize resulting injuries." Id. With
this I agree, as my defense of the mandatory warranty offering indicates. My contention,
nonetheless, is that the merchant, although harmed in some sense, is not legally
"injured." Cf Kuklin, supra note 108, at 17 n.55 (distinguishing "harm" from "injury").
The merchant may be worse off, but the loss is not one to which it can morally claim an
entitlement, even if there is an efficiency loss.
149. See CAtABRESI, supra note 5, at 13 ("1 cannot tie myself to the mast without also
tying you.... Either way, compulsion is inevitable."). The first of Sunstein's categories
of cases, sometimes understood as paternalism, see supra note 10, is when "a majority
may have a collective preference; the public, acting through government, may attempt to
bind itself against the satisfaction of its own misguided choices." Sunstein, supra note 7,
at 1138. In justifying this category, which is "quite different from ordinary paternalism
or from a system in which majorities impose their will on minorities because they
disapprove of the conduct in question," id. at 1141, Sunstein argued that:
The foreclosure of the preferences of a minority is unfortunate, but in
general it is hard to see what argument there might be for creating an
across-the-board rule against self-binding through politics. . . . [Tihe
choice is between the preferences of the majority and those of the
minority ... [but since it] will interfere with minority desires .... it should
for that reason be permitted only when less restrictive alternatives,
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intervention is not ideal, it is better than none. 50  Why should I
capitulate?' 5' Am I not ... ?
ONLOOKER: Even if Merchant has no personal moral claim
against you, Consenter, to benefit from the outcome of your asym-
metrical rationality, I shall advocate the commonly held view that
you have no proper claim to interfere with the status quo in the way
you have chosen. While, all else equal, I generally favor proposals
that would help you get what you want,'5 2 all else is not likely to be
including private arrangements and limitations to those who wish to be
bound, are impossible or ineffective.
Id. at 1142; see also KLEINIG, supra note 7, at 110-11 (urging least restrictive alternative to
minimize spillovers of self-paternalism). One of the cases in which the codification of
second-order preferences is weakest is where "the second-order preference reflects
some special weakness on the part of the majority," for example, a curfew law to keep
the peace among the warring majority. Sunstein, supra, at 1143. Our situation is en-
demic, and not a product of "some special weakness." Another problem according to
Sunstein is in discerning when the majority's motivation is self-paternalistic rather than
paternalistic. See id. at 1143-45.
150. In light of the ubiquity of take-it-or-leave-it contracts, consumers regularly being
"contract terms takers," Goldberg proposed the appointment of an agent, possibly the
legislature or its delegate, who would aid consumers in the creation of standardized
contract terms. Goldberg, supra note 29, at 76. For some of the reasons discussed here,
Goldberg recognized that not all consumers would benefit, or benefit equally, from such
an arrangement. See id. He responded with the question: "But how might the[ ] [results]
compare to the 'no government' case in which the legislature delegates the task of
determining the standardized terms directly to the firm?" Id. at 76-77.
151. Kleinig called this the "collective good" argument. KLEINIG, supra note 7, at 191-
92. Feinberg contended that consumer protection laws are not paternalistic, even with
respect to the minority of consumers who disapprove of them,
if the implicit rationale of the law - the account of its role, function, and
motivation that most coheres with the known facts - is to enable the
majority to secure its goals, not to enforce prudence on the unwilling
minority. . . . Where alternative arrangements that would satisfy both
groups at tolerable [administrative and economic] cost are obviously
available, then the interpretation of the 'implicit rationale' as paternalistic
gains plausibility.
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 4, at 21. See also supra note 19 (motives for action);
cf. FEINBERG, supra note 16, at 58-59 (discussing legislative adjustment of unavoidably
opposed interests based upon relative importance). G. Dworkin agreed with Feinberg,
using water flouridation as an example, the relevant conditions being that the majority
interest is important, the imposition on the minority is relatively minor, and "the admin-
istrative and economic costs of not imposing on the minority would be very high."
Dworkin, supra note 26, at 110. He concluded with a caveat: "However, fairness requires
that if there are economic costs to the minority (such as purchasing nonfluoridated
water), they should be borne by those who gain." Id. In the situation under considera-
tion, how could the consenters compensate the nonconsenters? Shapiro also argued
that the case of fluoridated water is not one of paternalism. See Shapiro, supra note 7, at
526.
152. Onlooker is not being paternalistic:
Even when .4 does not stand to benefit at all, action with respect to B is
not paternalist ifA 's purpose is to facilitate an efficient result or to give B
something that B clearly wants but cannot obtain without help. An
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equal. Government intervention involves matters of basic principle,
including distributive justice and political theory, and the practical
effects are often problematic, nay, downright perverse. Yes, it
seems unfair for Merchant to take advantage of your inherent trans-
actional impediments, let alone the imposed ones, yet, nevertheless,
it may be wrong for you to respond, not by private counteraction,
but by summoning the aid of the government. There are many ob-
jections to intervention.
To begin with, the government apparatus is costly, offsetting the
purported improvement in market efficiency.' 53 Even when the ap-
propriateness of intervention is beyond dispute, the government's
instrumentalities operate with such imprecision that unanticipated
negative consequences usually occur. Your personal situation may
even be worsened because, historically, when industries are regu-
lated by agencies, the industries typically capture the regulator and
ultimately benefit from the intervention.154 Ongoing regulation cre-
ates uncertainty which produces inefficiency.' 55 Because many of
the costs of regulation are usually externalities that are not reflected
in the price of the regulated transaction, whether efficiency gains are
obtained is difficult to discern. Overall, from a utilitarian stand-
point, the undesirable, unforeseen repercussions usually outweigh
all but the great, substantially certain gains.' 56
From a deontological standpoint, by mustering the united power
of society against Merchant, you jeopardize everyone's autonomy
example of the former is a warranty implied in law if the warranty is (a)
based on the belief that the seller is normally in the best position to
detect and to insure against any defect and (b) one that the parties to a
transaction are free to reject for whatever reason they choose.
Shapiro, supra note 7, at 526.
153. But cf supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing cost of law reform).
154. Coase made this point while attacking the intervention proposed by Goldberg,
supra note 29 (discussed supra note 150). See Ronald H. Coase, The Choice of the
Institutional Framework: A Comment, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 29, at
77, 78; see also infra note 186 (discussing capture theory of regulation). Goldberg was
satisfied that the net result of regulation is better than none. See supra note 150.
155. On the inefficiency resulting from uncertainty, see, e.g., Issac Ehrlich & Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 262-71 (1974);
see also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 402-06 (1973); but see Duncan Kennedy & Frank
Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 759-62 (1980); cf
Jon Elster, Taming Chance: Randomization in Individual and Social Decisions, in 9 THE TANNER
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 105, 110 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1988) ("It is true that
uncertainty makes it difficult to plan for the future, but without uncertainty we might not
even want to plan for the future at all.").
156. Overtones of Burke are heard in this plaint. See generally EDMUND BURKE ON
GOVERNMENT, POLITICS AND SOCIETY (Brian W. Hill ed., 1975). One need not be a
utilitarian to agree.
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with the spectre of the tyranny of the majority. By rationalizing the
regulation of the marketplace in this way, you tread on the slippery
slope which offers little resistance to further incursions.' 57 Taking
this step desensitizes your compunctions, perceptions and reason-
ing about imposing moralisms to enforce other restrictions., 5  Now
you take aim at the marketplace, but where will it end? 5 9 Govern-
ment power, like other power, corrupts and grows, leading to self-
aggrandizement and abuse of discretion.' 60 Look around, who can
deny it?
All members of society have at least a prima facie right to be free
from government intervention. The status quo, in this case the ab-
sence of intervention, raises legitimate expectations that warrant
protection. You, Consenter, are the plaintiff with the burden of
proof. One can quite reasonably judge that you have not met it. If
not, you are wrong to beckon the government, even if Merchant is
wrong to take advantage of you. Two wrongs do not make a right.
CONSENTER: You thrust many points for me to parry. About
the utilitarian assertion of the bad outweighing the good, I have lit-
tle to say. If it is shown that more good, say, an overall increase in
personal preference satisfaction, eventuates from allowing Merchant
to take advantage of differential rationalities, then your utility argu-
ment is potent to some commentators. 16  This is an empirical affair
that is resolved only by astute analysis and field study. But irrespec-
157. See, e.g., KLEINIG, supra note 7, at 190-91.
158. The fallacy of composition looms, whereby one cannot assume a whole set of
interventions is compatible with a well-functioning market just because each member of
the set alone is compatible. See BUCHANAN, supra note 1, at 25 ("From the fact that each
grain of sand in a mountain of sand is light it does not follow that the mountain is
light.").
159. The intervention may set a precedent later proving unfortunate. See ANTHONY
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 183-84 (1957). Party politics is not the
complete solution. See id. at 160-62 (discussing conflicts between party and individual
rationality). Hayek believed that the institutions designed to protect individual freedom
from progressive encroachment by the government are insufficient. See I FRIEDRICH A.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 55 (1973). Finnis warned of the slippery slope:
" 'I wish someone had stopped me from . . .': if this can rationally be said (as it can), it
follows necessarily that even the most extensive and excessive programme of
paternalism might be instituted without denial of equal concern and respect to
anybody." JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 222-23 (1980); but see
Wojciech Sadurski, The Right, the Good and theJurisprude, 7 LAw & PHIL. 35, 52-54 (1988)
(rebutting Finnis on basis of his failure to distinguish between "equal concern" and
"equal respect").
160. For brief discussion with citations, see Kuklin, supra note 83, at 882.
161. Kronman advanced a "paretian" argument, allegedly consistent with
libertarianism (a nonconsequentialist, rights-based orientation), that a kind of
advantage-taking is justified if most people suffering the disadvantage will be better ofl"
in the long run. See Kronman, supra note 124, at 484-85. The libertarian subscription to
this approach is disputed mainly on the grounds that individual rights cannot be
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tive of this bottom line, the consequentialist justification does not
overcome my claim. While some theorists have heard the death
knell of this Benthamite morality, I concede that the reported de-
mise is greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, the dominant moral sua-
sion today is rights-based deontology, which I mainly rely on.
Kantian morality supports the strong intuition, undermined by utili-
tarianism, that persons are not to be used as a means only to an-
other's or society's ends, in other words, that rights trump utility.
I agree that intervention is a mixed blessing. Still, attending to
utility, I contend on the grounds of the tradeoffs I addressed already
that the goods most likely outweigh the bads.162 Let us pursue this
question with subsidized review. Meanwhile, if one can synthesize
or commensurate moral theories, even if there is economic loss, this
loss is dominated by the gain in basic fairness and justice. Because I
represent the majority of consumers, any interference with the lib-
erty of Merchant and Nonconsenter - the "liberty" of the exploit-
ing Merchant reeking of "license" - is subordinate to the gain in
my material freedom and substantive equality. 163
About your deontological claim that it is wrong for me to seek
government assistance, I must point out that by this move I am not
running afoul of Kant's categorical imperative. I am not treating
Merchant or Nonconsenter as a means only to my own ends, nor am
I violating the universalizability principle. First, the end being
sought is the achievement of consumer autonomy. Individual au-
tonomy is the pretheoretic, antecedent requisite of individual rights.
To put it another way, talk of (autonomous) persons using other
(autonomous) persons as means only to their own ends presupposes
autonomy. For the person who is 'denied full autonomy by inherent
or imposed conditions, or at least denied autonomy equal to the
other interactor, means to ends are not involved in the establish-
ment of increased or equivalent autonomy. Instead, the actions are
means to beginnings. Until I am in an autonomous state, or suffi-
ciently so, I am not capable of satisfactorily judging which potential
ends to embrace, to say nothing of the means to achieve them. As I
sacrificed for group benefits. See Conrad A. Johnson, The Idea of Autonomy and the
Foundations of Contractual Liability, 2 LAw & PHIL. 271, 292 (1983).
162. Does the uncertainty of the overall consequences destroy the argument for self-
paternalism? Cf RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 114 (1985) ("Some uncertainty must be tolerated at the edges; sound
social institutions will never stand or fall on the marginal classification issues that test
every legal doctrine.").
163. The hard tradeoffs are unavoidable. "Liberty and equality are often at odds with
one another, as are liberty and security, or prosperity and justice." Anthony Quinton,
Introduction, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 4, at 17.
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contended before, my endeavor to expand my own autonomy does
not unjustifiably interfere with the autonomy of Merchant or Non-
consenter. Therefore, even though my self-paternalistic endeavor
may redistribute wealth from them to me, the end in mind is not to
obtain the shift in wealth, possibly in the name of distributive jus-
tice, 164 but rather it occurs as a secondary effect of my expansion of
my own autonomy. The wealth they might lose from the interven-
tion is not wealth they deserve. Nor, prior to the intervention, do I
deserve to lose wealth to them, particularly pertaining to that lost
from Merchant's exploitation.
Second, the standard under which I seek intervention does not
run afoul of Kant's universalizability principle. I am quite content
with the universalized maxim whereby the government is to rectify
the imperfections in the marketplace that impinge on autonomy.
That this can be done justly is the force of much of my argument. 16 5
There is nothing self-defeating or self-contradictory about the
maxim.
The slippery slope argument that the government cannot be
trusted to maintain an appropriate balance once it intervenes is, as
always, formidable. 166 Indeed, the risk of slippage exists, but one
should not make too much of it. "Can" does not imply "will." By
referring to instances of abuse, nay-sayers can raise a sword of Dam-
ocles over any government action, including that which is aimed at
remedying manifest injustice. The slippery slope argument is too
powerful. For example, once we allow the government to criminal-
ize homicide, this facilitates the machinations of overzealous legisla-
tors who will then slide down the slope by rationalizing the
criminalization of such lesser offenses as, say, arson, and then bur-
glary, littering, nosepicking, and the failure to smile when passing a
police officer.' 67 Where will it all end? I am being facetious, of
164. Kronman contended that paternalistic limitations to contractual freedom, e.g.,
"refusing to permit the voluntary waiver of certain warranties, such as the warranty of
habitability, follows from the idea that in some circumstances a prohibition of this sort
may be an essential part of a program of distributive justice." Kronman, supra note 7, at
770. For his defense, see id. at 770-74.
165. Rawls, the Kantian, in remarking on economic systems, asserted that "market
failures and imperfections are often serious, and . . . . lack of information, external
economies and diseconomies, and the like must be recognized and corrected." RAWLS,
supra note 4, at 272.
166. See generally Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985). "A
slippery slope argument claims that permitting the instant case - a case that it concedes
to be facially innocuous and that it linguistically distinguishes from the danger case -
will nevertheless lead to, or increase the likelihood of, the danger case." Id. at 369.
167. This verges into "the argument from added authority" which Schauer
distinguished from the slippery slope argument. See id. at 367-68. It posits "that
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couse, but not altogether. Reasoning such as this grounds the mini-
mal government of the nightwatchman state libertarians, 168 and
even unabashed anarchy.' 69 While few citizens wish to push the
point this far, the argument certainly merits serious attention. This
is one reason why I have proposed merely the mandatory offering of
a warranty. It is far up the slope of intervention, and it is justifiable
on a pretheoretic autonomy basis and possibly on efficiency
grounds, without reference to paternalistic or distributive motiva-
tions. While indeed this is a step on the slope, a suitable toehold
can be carved. Itself, the required warranty offering will not slide
imperceptibly. A warranty is a familiar instrument with a well-cir-
cumscribed reach.' 70 Once experience has been gained with this
regulation, the legislature may consider further steps. Prudence will
require the search for toeholds. How far will this go?' 7 1 I answer
with Cardozo, who responded to a slippery slope argument by stat-
ing that the courts will draw the necessary line "by considerations of
convenience, of utility, and of the deepest sentiments ofjustice."1 72
Expectations of nonintervention are, I contend, not legitimate.
Typically stemming from the prior state of nonintervention, they
have no legitimacy beyond that provided by the status quo itself,
which is insubstantial.173 First, moral arguments to preserve the sta-
granting additional authority to a decisionmaker inevitably increases the likelihood of a
wide range of possible future events, one of which might be the danger case." Id. at 367.
168. Nozick contended "that [only] a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of
protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified."
NozicK, supra note 56, at ix. He championed private mutual-protection associations.
See supra note 56 for a discussion of such associations.
169. See, e.g., WOLFF, supra note 27.
170. R. Dworkin cryptically noted that this counter "depends not on the slippery
slope but on that different weapon, the bright line (or absence of the same)." RONALD
DWORKIN, Do lVe Have a Right to Pornography?, in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 335, 414 n.3
(1985). Schauer distinguished "the argument from excess breadth" from the slippery
slope argument. See Schauer, supra note 166, at 366-67. "The problem of excess
breadth can be remedied by narrowing the principle wholesale until it no longer
includes the danger cases, or by specifically designating the danger cases as exceptions
to the stated principle .... It is not a response, however, that defeats a slippery slope
objection . . . " Id. at 366.
171. "The classic response is, not unexpectedly, from Holmes. '[Wihere to draw the
line . . . is the question in pretty much everything worth arguing in the law.' Irwin v.
Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168 (1925)." Schauer, supra note 166, at 380 n.52.
172. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OFJUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (regarding
hardships from retrospective effects ofjudge-made law). For an argument that, rather
than capitulating to the imperfections of the invisible hand by total retreat from the
slope, the line must be drawn somewhere, see KLEINIG, supra note 7, at 191. Schauer
noticed a self-paternalistic aspect to the basic argument. "At times slippery slope
arguments may be pleas to decisionmakers to fear their own weaknesses." Schauer, supra
note 166, at 374.
173. See supra note 122 (discussing moral inertia).
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tus quo generally favor the powerful against the weak, the ins
against the outs, 174 and therefore often come down to special plead-
ing by special interests. Second, reasonable expectations reflect the
common knowledge that the law is far from static. This condition is
evidenced by the modern trend of regulation and, if unsuccessful or
out of political fashion, deregulation, and then, perchance, reregula-
tion. In our dynamic society the status quo is change.' 75 Third, reli-
ance upon the continuation of the existing state of affairs is
unwarranted when, as here, the status quo gives rise to inherent and
imposed unfairness, inefficiency aside. In a just society, expecta-
tions based upon the endurance of pockets of injustice are not legiti-
mate. In sum, the legitimate expectations and related reliance
arguments are question-begging assertions, not defensible vindica-
tions of just rights.
Finally, the "two wrongs" principle is inapplicable. My self-pater-
nalism is not a wrong in response to Merchant's wrong. Because
Merchant has not treated me as I deserve, I have no obligation to
treat Merchant as it might otherwise deserve.' 76 Notwithstanding,
because my action is a cautiously minimal, reasonable counter to
Merchant's unfair advantage-taking, I do nothing wrong. I am not
fighting fire with fire, as by taking advantage of Merchant; I am fight-
ing fire with water.1 77
To conclude in a less confident voice, I wish that I could offer
irrefutable moral and economic arguments for my self-paternalistic
invocation of government intervention. But in this context, as is
174. See J.L. MACKIE, HUME'S MORAL THEORY 154-55 (1980).
175. To put this in reductionist, law and economic terms, one could say that the
cognizable value of the various vested interests includes an ex ante discount for the
probability and extent of potential government incursions. In other words, when
making an economic choice the rational person, knowing of the risk of intervention,
takes the monetized risk into account and therefore suffers no legal injury when the
incursion eventuates. I argue elsewhere that this analysis, by assuming
"superrationality," like the slippery slope argument, is too powerful. See Kuklin, supra
note 81.
176. A "general rule that is often endorsed ... directs each person to treat every
other as he deserves, what a person deserves here being a matter of whether he treated
the person he treated as well as that person deserved. (This is not a definition of
deserving but only a condition of any definition of it.)" FREDERIC SCHICK, HAVING
REASONS, 78 (1984).
177. Fighting fire with fire may be morally permissible, for example, in responding to
the threat of violence with violence. A.W. Cragg, Violence, Law, and the Limits of Mforality, 8
LAW & PHIL. 301, 308-09 (1989). "This view implies that those who use violence to
achieve their goals both ignore and undermine the moral status of those on whom their
violence impinges." Id. at 309. May the terms, "advantage-taking" or "exploitation,"
be substituted for "violence"?
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plain from today's political scene, such arguments have not been
found for either side of the debate.'17
NONCONSENTER: Yes, Consenter, despite your diffidence at
the end, what you say rings with plausibility and is persuasive
enough to carry the day for many, but you still have not satisfied me
with respect to my principal concern as expressed by Onlooker.
Even with a notched, well-delineated toehold on the slippery slope,
intervention remains a crude mechanism with subtle, unpredictable
and far-reaching effects, direct and indirect. When the basic issues
are clear and prima facie rights are not in conflict, unlike our case,
one may still question the overall value of whistling for the govern-
ment juggernaut. The lessons of history come down strongly
against you. This wolf must be kept from the door, even when you,
Consenter, see it as a guard dog. The government cannot be
trusted to do the good and right thing. As between Merchant and
the government, the depredations of Merchant are to be feared less.
It is rational to self-paternalistically fetter the irrational political and
legal processes. 179
As the stagelights fade, notice that crucial points of the dialogue
are largely spoken past the other disputants. In advocating inter-
vention, the consenting consumer emphasizes what might be called
a first order, self-regarding stance. The argument is mainly one-to-
one. To recapitulate, Consenter says: "The circumstances of the
marketplace produce or facilitate an asymmetry between you,
Merchant, and me in the conditions for responsible action. Because
I cannot rationally counter these circumstances either individually
or by private group efforts, for this reason alone I am not at fault for
my disadvantage and do not deserve the ensuing harm. Inasmuch
as you, Merchant, impose the obstacles by creating or increasing
them, you undoubtedly are blameworthy. If you simply take advan-
tage of the inherent asymmetries, you still remain without a desert
basis for the benefits you derive, and, arguably, you even deserve to
have them denied. With respect to you, Nonconsenter and On-
looker, I cannot confidently claim the moral high ground. Yet I can
assert at least that my ground is as high as yours. It is unfortunate
178. Kennedy's position stands: "[T]here are extant no theories of moral conduct or
of rights that convincingly indicate even in their own terms what the rules about
agreements should be." Kennedy, supra note 4, at 565.
179. Recall "the sober Kantian reminder that, if man is an animal who needs a master,
the masters, too, are just such animals. Masters are prone to do evil not merely out of
self-love or malice, but out of misguided zeal." John M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of
"Duties to Oneself-: Kant v. .eo-Kantians, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 456 (1987) (footnote
omitted).
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that all three of us cannot get what we want, but why should I defer
to you? In the end, none of you has a personal moral claim against
my limited, reasonable invocation of government assistance. More-
over, the proposed regulation appears to make the market more
efficient."
The three anti-interveners are ultimately resorting to what might
be called a second order, self-regarding stance. The argument is
mainly one-to-many, against society as a collective. 180 By way of
summary, once the outer defensive walls are weakened or breached
by Consenter's first order attack, the anti-interveners retreat to this
citadel: "Yes, there may be unfairness and inefficiency in the market-
place, but, be that as it may, you, with the collective at your side,
cannot be trusted to intervene in such a manner as to do more good
than bad, more justice than injustice.' 8 1 Even if there is merit to
your proposal, public choice theory suggests that this alone does
not determine the legislative response. 182 History is replete with ex-
amples of the misuse of government power and scant with counter-
180. Strasnick analyzed society's paths to resolve the conflicting interests of
individuals in light of the public interest or social good. See Steven Strasnick, Individual
Rights and the Social Good. A Choice-Theoretic Analysis, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 415 (1982). He
found the paths always controversial and frustrating of some private interests. Id. at
415. Strasnick concluded that, therefore, when society "has defined some unifying
conception of the social good, the basic conflict may still not have disappeared but may
merely have changed its character. Individual interests, once in conflict with other
individual interests, are now in conflict with the social good." Id.
181. One must not confuse
two very different questions, namely 'Is it right for people to act in a
certain way?' and 'Is it right for the state to command such action?'....
For questions of the latter sort demand a consideration of evils inherent
in the legal process itself ... as well as those evils which the law attempts
to prohibit.
FELIX S. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 62-63 (1933). For an example of
this criticism aimed at judicial intervention, see Alan Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining
Power and the Judicial Process, 49 IND. L.J. 367, 368 (1974) ("My thesis is that courts are
institutionally incapable of choosing the defining values [of the notion of unequal bar-
gaining power] and finding the relevant facts.").
182. For introductions to the economic theory of regulatory decisionmaking that
derives from public choice theory, see Bruce Chapman & John Quinn, Efficiency, Liberty
and Equality: Three Ethical Justifications for Regulatory Reform, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 512,
529-34 (1982); Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of
Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 45-52 (1988). "Public choice theory's general
prediction is that small groups of voters with low organization costs and potentially
large per capita gains from the favourable regulatory decisions will become
disproportionately influential in the regulatory process." Chapman & Quinn, supra, at
529. Small groups can, first, better control freeriders and, second, with the large per
capita gains as an incentive, better mobilize members for coordinated political action.
See id.; Macey, supra, at 48. For a general introduction to public choice theory capped by
the argument that it has unduly influenced legal scholarship by implanting a deep
distrust of legislatures that is not adequately supported, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).
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examples.' 83 Therefore, in the name of social good and justice,
even if at some tradeoff of private good and justice, your proposal,
Consenter, should be rejected."' 84
In further pursuing this second order argument, the anti-inter-
veners will point out, as seen in the last line of the dialogue, the
analogy between it and Consenter's first order argument. As the
consumer is subject to irrationalities of various origins in making
individual choices, so also is society subject to irrationalities in mak-
ing collective choices,' 8 5 and even additional ones.' 86 To elucidate,
There are other reasons that merit might not determine legislative decisionmaking.
For example, "majority [political] views may be, though they are not always, ill-informed
and impervious to argument." H.L.A. HART, Between Utility and Rights, in ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 198, 218 (1983). Wonnell summed up some of the
problems documented by public choice theory: "[T]he information reaching legislators
is starkly distorted; subtleties of detail are lost in statistical aggregates, and concentrated
interests lobby heroically. As for incentives, the democratic process creates an incentive
to pass a continuous stream of laws with visible, concentrated benefits and invisible,
diffuse harms." Christopher T. Wonnell, Problems in the Application of Political Philosophy to
Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 123, 141 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
183. Political conservatives are particularly concerned about this. For an extended
example of this conservative, second order response to proposed intervention, see
Epstein's implicit criticism, Richard A. Epstein, Luck, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Autumn 1988,
at 17, of the redistributive implications of Christman's argument that "competitive
markets do not allocate goods according to a principle of desert," John Christman,
Entrepreneurs, Profits and Deserving Market Shares, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Autumn 1988, at 1,
16. Liberals also worry. For example, Ackerman, noting the "countless ways in which a
laissez faire regime fails to allocate resources efficiently," which may be improved upon
by government intervention, fretted about "the illiberal uses that a utilitarian may make
of the market-failure rationale." ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 265; see also id. at 235
(indicating apprehension over potential corruption of public officials who legislate and
administrate intervention).
184. The conclusion cuts more than one way:
There are many good acts that ought to be prohibited either because they
cannot be clearly distinguished in the law from the more important evils,
or for any of the other reasons suggested above [such as the one quoted
supra note 181].... And for the same reasons of general expediency and
security the law must permit and even command acts that are bad.
COHEN, supra note 181, at 65.
185. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 8, at 349 ("If consumers are susceptible to judgmental
bias, then regulators are similarly imperiled."). Becker believed that the imperfections
in the political sector, at least as important as those in the marketplace, have major
implications for the question whether "the existence of market imperfections justify
government intervention." GARY S. BECKER, Competition and Democracy, in THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 33, 37-38 (1976). "The answer would be 'no' if the
imperfections in government behavior were greater than those in the market. It may be
preferable not to regulate economic monopolies and to suffer their bad effects, rather
than to regulate them and suffer the effects of political imperfections." Id. at 38; but see
FRANK H. KNIGHT, Freedom as Fact and Criterion, in FREEDOM AND REFORM, supra note 44, at
1, 2-3 (cautioning against "emphasis on the stupidity of governments rather than the
competence of individuals"). Regarding Becker's view, the relative imperfections of the
market and the political sector is an empirical question that probably varies with
circumstances. See Neil Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: 4
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a pluralistic society committed to a neutral conception of the
"good", as is ours, has the demanding task of accommodating a
wide range of acceptable values, some of which are difficult to un-
derstand and empathize with.'8 7 Social choice can be swayed by
special pleaders just as individual choice can be skewed by inter-
ested parties.' 88 Even if those with a special interest in legislation,
presumably here a majority of the electorate, attempt to maintain
themselves in a position of reflective equilibrium, 8 9 the self-decep-
tive rationalizations of the interested, compounded by the dema-
goguery of the ambitious, too easily lead to misguided
Comparative Institutional Alternative, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1350, 1359 (1981). Unfortunately,
the empirical task is awesome. See id. at 1359-60.
186. One problem is that a "normative theory of [group] rationality, linking action to
desires and beliefs," must face the difficulty from "the principle of methodological
individualism[ ] [that] there do not exist collective desires or collective beliefs." ELSTER,
Introduction, supra note 8, at 3. Then, under Arrow's impossibility theorem for social
choice, one cannot assume that group choices have "the consistency properties required
by the descriptive conception of rationality." Id. Under the cartelization or rent-seeking
theory of the political process, which "views politics as a negative sum game," and under
the capture theory of regulation, which "contends that the regulatory process is often
captured by the regulated, to the detriment of the citizenry," the justification for
regulation is challenged. Romano, supra note 88, at 320 (footnote omitted). See, e.g.,
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 3
(1971) ("[A]s a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated
primarily for its benefit."). Romano doubted, however, that consumers would be
disadvantaged by disclosure requirements, though they may be under a regime of
product regulation. See Romano, supra, at 320-21.
187. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 647-49. Owing mainly to this factor, in the final
paragraph of his article discussing "ad hoc paternalism," Kennedy urged a surprisingly
tame conclusion: "The only way to reduce the risk of making mistakes for which one is
responsible no matter how good one's intentions is to deal with people who are not at a
great distance, who are not strangers." Id. at 649. It seems to me that conservatives, if I
can empathize with them, might accept Kennedy's agenda, if this is all it is. Apparently I
can empathize with conservatives, Milton Friedman anyway, see infra note 198.
188. See supra note 182 for a discussion of public choice theory.
189. Reflective equilibrium, championed by Rawls, is a means of reaching
"considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted" by going back and forth among
contemplated premises, convictions, and principles. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 20. The
issue, arguably, is not one of second-best.
'First best' principles correspond roughly with the ideal of pure
normative philosophy, while any factual 'imperfections' in the world such
as incomplete information or incentives to misuse power generally are
accommodated by more or less ad hoc modifications of the first best
principles.... [T]he applied political philosophy ideal seeks a philosophy
that produces good results when the fallible political human mind
consciously interacts with it; it is not second best because there is no
alternative philosophy that could produce better interactions.
Wonnell, supra note 182, at 128-29 (footnote and emphasis omitted); cf supra note 103
(theory of second best).
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enactments.' 90 Finally, because the relatively powerful are better
able to exploit inherent and imposed sources of irrationalities, this
class is more likely to reap the benefits of unwise public actions as
well as private ones.' 9 ' In sum, there is little guarantee that social
choices are rational.
While there is no way to silence these first and second order argu-
ments, they can be quieted. The self-paternalistic collective, pulling
down the veil of ignorance to circumvent the subjectivities of special
interests and the improprieties of outright paternalism, would ra-
tionally choose to design the political marketplace ex ante in such a
way as to minimize the risk of irrational social choices, that is, those
choices that are contrary to the public weal.' 92 The plausible polit-
ical strictures are procedural, substantive, and structural. 193
190. Sunstein also was disquieted by the rationality of intervention to prevent the
exploitation of distorted preferences: "The argument that preferences are
nonautonomous may be used as a pretext to disguise illegitimate motivations; and a
court or other institution will not have an easy time distinguishing pretext from reality."
Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1172. Nevertheless, this "does not undermine the claims that
there are significant malfunctions in a system based on private preferences, and that the
malfunctions sometimes do and should serve as the basis for legal intervention." Id.
Going further, Goodin challenged the critics of market intervention who perceive the
political sector also as a market, yet object to the operation of this market as being
"motivated by dishonorable 'distributional' rather than honorable 'efficiency'
considerations. . . . Minimally, advocates of markets over politics must explain what
makes money, and 'efficiency' defined in terms of it, so decisively superior to the
currency of votes and efficiency defined in terms of them." Robert E. Goodin, The Ethics
of Smoking, 99 ETHICS 574, 605 (1989) (references omitted).
191. Because it is more economic for merchants to influence the government, and the
consumer as voter is subject to imperfect conditions for rational choice, "[u]nder these
conditions, government is bound to be more attentive to producers than consumers
when it creates policy." DowNs, supra note 159, at 255.
192. Facing the general problem of irrational social choice, Fuller proposed "the
political metatheory of irrationalism," originating with Machiavelli, whose "fundamental
precept is that no political theory or program should be accepted unless it somehow
takes into account the cognitive liabilities of the large numbers of people who would
function as governors and governed." Steve Fuller, Playing Without a Full Deck: Scientific
Realism and the Cognitive Limits of Legal Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 549, 579 (1988) (emphasis
omitted). In particular, "Axiomatic social choice theory ... reveals the imperfection not
only of the invisible hand of the market, but of the visible hand of the state and of the
cheshire-cat hand at work in a mixed economy-in any legal order." Allan Gibbard,
Social Choice Theory and the Imperfectability of a Legal Order, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401, 402-03
(1982). Gibbard concluded that, if his analysis holds, "a main task of the further
development of the subject [of axiomatic social choice theory] will be an exploration of
the compromises that must be made in the design of a legal order." Id. at 413. Murphy
stated that a check on arbitrary government action requires "the formulation of a public,
objective theory of rationality and rational willing." JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Marxism and
Retribution, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra note 14, at 93, 101-02. The
social contract theory, in the view of Kant and Rawls, can provide this and avoid
arbitrariness by allowing objective evaluation of chosen rules. Id.
193. The reason the government was originally established, at least a rational
justification for it, is self-paternalism. Hume, like Hobbes, thought so by means of this
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The liberal founders of the American political system opted to
ameliorate the risk of misguided social choices primarily by two
mechanisms: a constitutional form of government with decentral-
ized concentrations of power.' 94 The Constitution and amend-
ments specifically guarantee vital individual rights.' 95 In further
amending the Constitution, substantial procedural hurdles and
mandated super-majoritarianism protect against curtailments of
these existing rights. Forced to stand back from the turmoil of pass-
ing passions when making momentous decisions, the cooled con-
templation of the political persona fosters reflective equilibrium.' 96
Ill-conceived actions by a governmental body, though depending
somewhat on the subject matter and the place in the hierarchy, must
reasoning: Though voluntary conformity to the principles ofjustice is in one's long-term
interest, because it will gain the cooperation of everyone else, often one's short-term
interest is to violate the principles. Because people often succumb to the temptations of
smaller short-term gains, this destroys the trust of others who then refuse to cooperate.
The predicament is solved by binding oneself to the principles ofjustice by founding a
government in which it is made in the public officials' immediate interest that the
principles, made into rules, be observed. See MACKIE, supra note 174, at 106-08;
Dworkin, supra note 7, at 23; see also HAYEK, supra note 36, at 180-82 (noting that
constitutional system does not involve absolute limitation on will of people, but merely
subordination of immediate objectives for long-term ones); RAWLS, supra note 4, at 248-
49. The main difficulty of the solution is in keeping it in the interest of the officials that
the rules be observed. Perhaps, "[i]nstead, the goal is to make sure that undesirable
individual traits are localized (but not wholly neutralized) by a network of institutions
that diffuse power in ways political scientists interested in pluralism have long stressed."
Richard A. Epstein, Private Property and the Public Domain: The Case of Antitrust, in ETHICS,
ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 48, 53 (. Ronald Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1982).
194. "[T]he correct aim for an economics-minded constitutional-designer apparently
is to precribe [sic] a set of institutions calculated to minimize over time the total of the
costs of market failure and political failure." Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or
What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 494-95 (1979).
Though probably no one particular constitutional model is demonstrably the best at
this, "One can, however, contend with at least surface plausibility that the typical
republican model is a reasonable one for minimizing the total of the costs to individuals of
their interactions in society ..... Id. at 495.
195. See Sunstein, supra noie 7, at 1141 ("The Constitution itself may be regarded as
an effort to prevent present or future majorities from engaging in imprudent conduct;
constitutional rights may be understood as the protection of second-order
preferences."); see also, JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Cruel and Unusual Punishments, in
RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra note 14, at 167, 223 ("The Constitution is a
document of moral principle and is in this sense anti-democratic."). Sagoff, supra note
102, at 1395 n. I1 ("The threat of tyranny ... requires only that this [legislative] power
[to make policy based on moral belief] be constrained by a system of civil and political
rights."); but see Hubin, supra note 12, at 90-91 (questioning whether Constitution can be
seen as case of precommitment).
196. For example, the rights of property and contract must be protected from "the
sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed." Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 138 (1810). See HAYEK, supra note 36, at 181-82 ("A free society certainly
needs permanent means of restricting the powers of government, no matter what the
particular objective of the moment.").
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often pass the scrutiny of another governmental level (e.g., state and
federal) or branch (e.g., legislative and judicial). When this occurs,
the deliberative processes leading to a questionable result must be
partially replicated each time another level of government considers
a complementary matter. The separation of powers within each
level also facilitates moderation. If, say, the legislative branch is
caught up in the passions of the moment, the executive or judicial
branches may temper them. Finally, an important restraint of gov-
ernment irrationality is that the elected officials must anticipate the
periodic justification of their actions to the electorate. This is done
after transient passions have cooled and in a manner akin to the
neutral dialogue between private parties. 197
The efficacy of these collectively self-paternalistic political struc-
tures is, however, probable only, not certain. Is social choice then,
"in fear and trembling,"'' 98 relegated to nonexperimentation or, at
best, pessimistic incrementalism? I think not, though eternal vigi-
lance is in order. 199 The issue of rational intervention turns largely
on relative institutional competence. 200 There are matters best han-
dled by private individuals, while others are best handled by the
government or by a particular level or branch. Deference, but not
obeisance, is given to the decisionmaker who, under the circum-
stances, is apparently best able to minimize irrationalities, to avoid
the risks. This may be due to the decisionmaker's privileged posi-
tion, the economies, the capacity to perceive and manage spillovers,
the relative balance of power among antagonists, or a myriad of
other factors. Having raised this formidable specter of determining
197. Even without an election to worry about, officials, as in a neutral dialogue,
"should be prepared to justify their conduct by stating in logical form the evaluative
generalizations and factual statements on which they base their evaluative conclusions.
Without this, the conclusions might be 'reasonable,' to use Dewey's distinction, but they
would not be 'reasoned,' that is, logically controlled." EDWIN W. PATTERSON, LAW IN A
SCIENTIFIC AGE 31 (1963) (footnote omitted).
198. Kennedy concluded that, principled paternalism being problematic, the ad hoc
paternalist must act, if at all, cautiously, "in fear and trembling." See Kennedy, supra
note 4, at 644. Strangely, even Milton Friedman, no enthusiast for intervention,
especially when paternalistic, spoke with less trepidation when he recognized that we
must face up to the unavoidability of paternalism. "We must put our faith, here as
elsewhere, in a consensus reached by imperfect and biased men through free discussion
and trial and error." MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 34 (1962).
199. The innuendo refers to the famous quote from a speech by John Philpot Curran
in 1790: "The condition upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal vigilance;
which condition if he break, servitude is at once the consequence of his crime and the
punishment of his guilt." JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 397 (15th ed. 1980).
(The footnote at the semicolon reads in part: "Attributed also to Jefferson." Id.)
200. See generally Komesar, supra note 185 (arguing that all legal decisions depend on
choice between imperfect alternative decision-making institutions in order to find one
that is least imperfect).
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relative institutional competence, I leave the details to others. 20 1
Still, without more bother with the details surrounding mandatory
warranty offerings, especially since warranties are appearing in vari-
ous markets without government prodding, it seems that many of
the purported risks of expanding the mandatory offerings are not
undue.
Let me succinctly conclude. The asymmetry between the actors in
the marketplace in the conditions of rational decisionmaking leads
to unfairness to the consumer and, seemingly, inefficiency. Private
self-paternalism as a general device, we learn from Odysseus, is ra-
tional and justifiable, and this applies to the consumer's methods for
countering the asymmetry. Under the circumstances, because
purely private means are unworkable, government intervention is
inviting. This creates the risk of other manifestations of irrationality
and unfairness, in particular, those resulting from the governmental
processes themselves. Therefore, in the end, we must learn another
lesson from Odysseus - how to maneuver between Scylla and
Charybdis.
201. "It only remains to work out the details - but in everyday life, the details are
everything." MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OFJUSTICE 91 (1983). Coase declared that the
particulars of government regulation must "come from a detailed investigation of the
actual results of handling the problem in different ways." Ronald H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3J.L. & EcoN. 1, 18-19 (1960). The prognosis for ideal solutions is bleak.
"In practice we must usually choose between unjust arrangements and then it is a matter
of finding the lesser injustice." John Rawls, Distributive Justice, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS
AND SOCIETY 58, 72 (Peter Laslett & W.G. Runciman eds., 3d series 1967).
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